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"Spoliation, in case you haven't heard, is the newest battleground
of contemporary litigation, now a continuing sideshow, if not the
main event, in courtrooms across the country."
-Robert E. Shapiro'
INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of electronic information has created new opportuni-
ties for litigators to prove facts at trial. The increasing use of email and other
forms of real-time electronic communication has enabled litigators to pro-
vide fact finders with highly persuasive contemporaneous records that were
unavailable two decades ago. These records can be particularly revealing
since people frequently use emails and other new forms of communication
casually, without imagining that they might one day surface at a trial. Litiga-
tors, by contrast, have come to expect that electronically stored information
will be available at trial, greatly expanding the scope of discovery.
Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. I want to thank Steven
Gensler and Richard Marcus for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this
Article. I am also grateful to my colleague, Sam Halabi, for his careful review of this Article.
In addition, I acknowledge financial support from a University of Tulsa Research Grant.
1. Robert E. Shapiro, Advance Sheet: Conclusion Assumed, LITIG., Spring 2010, at
59.
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While providing new sources of proof, emails and other forms of elec-
tronically stored information ("ESI") have also increased the costs of
litigation. Retrieving and reviewing electronically stored information can be
far more expensive than creating and storing it.2 Organizations and even
individuals increasingly retain large volumes of electronically stored infor-
mation, and consequently, they may have a substantial amount of potentially
relevant electronically stored information. The usefulness of the electroni-
cally stored information in litigation is often unknown, however, until an
attorney actually reviews it.
Production and review of electronically stored information is expensive,
sometimes monstrously so. Attorneys required to produce electronically
stored information may need to hire information technology experts to re-
trieve it and then spend hours reviewing it for privilege and responsiveness.
Opposing counsel then must spend hours reviewing the electronically stored
information for relevance and usefulness.'
Although electronically stored information may be stored indefinitely, it
is also readily altered or destroyed. Authors of embarrassing emails may be
tempted to delete copies of the emails from their outboxes in order to pre-
vent them from coming to light in litigation. Of course, other copies of the
emails might be recovered from the inboxes of their recipients, or else from
servers or backup devices, but recovery from these alternative locations may
be more expensive or not feasible. Furthermore, some types of electronic
information may not be intended to be stored, or they may be routinely
overwritten or destroyed in the ordinary course of business. In addition,
electronically stored information may be deleted accidentally.
Spoliation refers to the destruction or significant alteration of evidence.4
Spoliation has a long history in the courts, but the vulnerability of electroni-
cally stored information to deletion or alteration has generated increasing
concern by attorneys and courts. Judges seek ways both to deter spoliation
and provide an adequate remedy when it does occur. Increasingly, courts are
turning to sanctions to curtail spoliation. A recent survey of over 400 federal
2. See James N. Dertousos et al., The Legal and Economic Implications of Electronic
Discovery, RAND CORP., 2 (2008), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
occasional-papers/2008/RANDOP183.pdf ("Despite the potential of computer technology
to make storage, search, and exchange of information less expensive and less time-
consuming, the most frequent issue raised by those we interviewed was the enormous
costs-in time and money-to review information that is produced.").
3. See Loma G. Schofield, Opening Statement, LITIG., Spring 2010, at 1, 56
("[D]iscovery accounts for most of the cost of litigation, and ... more than half of the cost of
discovery comes from the relevance and privilege review, the mind-numbing tasks that em-
ploy our youngest lawyers.").
4. See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)
("Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve
property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.").
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cases involving motions for sanctions in connection with electronic discov-
ery appears below.'
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This graph is alarming, because it shows a rapid acceleration of motions
for sanctions involving electronic discovery in the past few years.' The sur-
vey reported that the most frequent ground for sanctions was spoliation.'
Motions for sanctions add to the cost of litigation and take up time that
could be better spent on the merits of the cases.' The dramatic increase in
5. Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Num-
bers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 795 (2010) (graph reproduced with permission).
6. Other surveys show large increases in the number of motions for sanctions and
discovery disputes over the past decade. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The
Need./or Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 551 n.15 (2010) (searching
Westlaw's ALLFEDS database for "discovery dispute" yields similar results); John M. Bar-
kett, Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Walking the Plank, Looking over Your
Shoulder, Fearing Sharks Are in the Water: E-Discovery in Federal Litigation? Presentation
at the Federal Civil Rule Advisory Committee's Conference on Civil Litigation at Duke Law
School 16 (May 10, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/John%20Barkett,%20Walking%20the%20Plank.pdf (searching
federal cases in Westlaw and Lexis databases involving sanctions motions shows large increases for
past decade).
7. See Willoughby et al., supra note 5, at 803 ("In the 230 cases in which sanctions
were awarded, the most common misconduct was failure to preserve ESI, which was the sole
basis for sanctions in ninety cases.").
8. See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.,
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Finally, I note the risk that sanctions mo-
tions, which are very, very time consuming, distracting, and expensive for the parties and the
court, will be increasingly sought by litigants. This, too, is not a good thing." (footnote omit-
ted)). Judge Scheindlin, the trial judge in this case, stated that she and her two law clerks had
spent "an inordinate amount of time on [the] motion. We estimate that collectively we have
spent close to three hundred hours ..... Id. at 471 n.56.
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motions for sanctions is also likely to produce collateral consequences be-
sides the time and expense directly spent on them by attorneys and judges.
Motions for sanctions are unpleasant for litigants, attorneys, and judges
due to their inherently punitive nature, and litigants and attorneys tend to
take them personally. Consequently, motions for sanctions exacerbate the
tensions between opposing parties and attorneys. As a result, they may inter-
fere with the development of cooperation and trust necessary for the
efficient handling of electronic discovery. 9 In addition, the potential threat of
sanctions may contribute to the cost of litigation by inducing parties to pre-
serve documents unnecessarily that would be neither admissible nor
discoverable."o
Furthermore, the availability of sanctions may encourage the use of
electronic discovery as a litigation weapon rather than as a means to
prepare for trial. For example, one party may make a sweeping request for
electronic evidence in order to drive up the costs of litigation for the
producing party in order to gain leverage for a favorable settlement." In
addition, a party might attempt to exploit the inadequacies of an opposing
party's computer system by making a request for electronic evidence not
because the attorney wants the evidence to use at trial, but rather for the
purpose of finding that some electronic evidence has been lost or
destroyed and then seeking sanctions.12
The recent rise in motions for sanctions involving electronic discovery
is reminiscent of the proliferation of motions for sanctions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1113 between 1983 and 1993. While the increase in
sanctions for spoliation appears related to the greater availability of elec-
tronic evidence, the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 were the cause of the
proliferations of sanctions under Rule 11.
The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 were made because experience had
shown that the original version of the rule was ineffective at deterring
abuse.' 4 New language was added to reduce judges' reluctance to impose
sanctions by expressly authorizing courts to impose sanctions, including
9. See William A. Gross Constr. Assocs. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134,
136 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Electronic discovery requires cooperation between opposing counsel
and transparency in all aspects of preservation and production of ESI.").
10. See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (S.D.
Tex. 2010) ("The frequency of spoliation allegations may lead to decisions about preserva-
tion based more on fear of potential future sanctions than on reasonable need for
information.").
11. See Barkett, supra note 6, at 12.
12. See Beisner, supra note 6, at 571.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
14. Id. advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment ("Experience shows that in
practice Rule II has not been effective in deterring abuses.").
4 [Vol. 18:1
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reasonable attorneys' fees, for violations of the rule." The federal courts
responded vigorously to the 1983 amendments. 16 The number of reported
Rule 11 decisions soared from just a handful of cases before 1983 to over
3,000 by the end of 1990.7 The spike in motions for sanctions generated
considerable controversy, and both bench and bar seemed preoccupied with
Rule 11.18 The Sixth Circuit summarized the fallout from the 1983 amend-
ments as follows:
The application of the 1983 version of Rule 11 provoked consider-
able commentary and was criticized for spawning satellite
litigation, abusing the rule's potential as a fee-shifting device, exac-
erbating incivility among lawyers and between bench and bar,
chilling creative advocacy, and disproportionately impacting plain-
tiffs over defendants, particularly in the civil rights arena."
The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 responded to concerns about the
overuse of sanctions by placing various constraints on their imposition.20
These included adding a "safe harbor" provision2 1 and limiting the amount
of sanctions to what is sufficient for deterrence rather than what would
compensate the moving party for the expense of the motion.22 The t993
amendments appear to have succeeded in causing the furor over Rule I I to
subside, as there have been no subsequent substantial amendments to the
rule.
15. Id. ("The new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose
sanctions, see Moore, Federal Practice 17.05, at 1547, by emphasizing the responsibilities
of the attorney and reinforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions.").
16. See William W. Schwarzer, Rule il: Entering a New Era, 28 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 7,
11 (1994) ("[T]here appears to be consensus among proponents as well as opponents that the
1983 amendment had a significant effect on practice in the federal courts, even if the precise
nature and extent of that effect was not quantifiable.").
17. Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FoRD-
HAM L. REV. 475,480 (1991).
18. See id. at 476 ("Rule 11 has become one of the most controversial topics in the
federal courts over the last eight years."); Georgene M. Vairo, The New Rule 11: Past as
Prologue?, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 39, 83 (1994) ("Over the last ten years, federal practition-
ers and judges have been quite preoccupied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I 1.").
19. Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 293 (6th Cir. 1997).
20. Id. ("Responding to these concerns, Rule II was substantially revised in 1993.
The new language broadens the scope of attorney obligations but places greater constraints
on the imposition of sanctions.").
21. FED. R. Clv. P. 11, advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment ("These provi-
sions are intended to provide a type of 'safe harbor' against motions under Rule II in that a
party will not be subject to sanctions on the basis of another party's motion unless, after
receiving the motion, it refuses to withdraw that position or to acknowledge candidly that it
does not currently have evidence to support a specified allegation.").
22. Id. ("The court has significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if any,
should be imposed for a violation, subject to the principle that the sanctions should not be
more severe than reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by the offending
person or comparable conduct by similarly situated persons.").
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Concerns with overuse of sanctions now focus on the spoliation of elec-
tronic evidence23 rather than Rule 11. In addition to dismissals, default
judgments, and monetary sanctions, courts have also imposed adverse infer-
ence jury instructions as sanctions in a number of cases. A recent survey
revealed that the federal courts imposed adverse jury instructions in
fifty-two24 of the 230 cases in which electronic discovery sanctions were
imposed. 25 While adverse inference jury instructions are not expressly au-
thorized as sanctions for violations of discovery obligations in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 37,26 courts have relied on their inherent authority to im-
pose adverse inference instructions to punish the spoliation of evidence. 27
This Article proposes that courts should refrain from imposing adverse
inference jury instructions as sanctions for the spoliation of evidence. This
proposal bears some similarity to the approach taken twenty years ago by
the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, which constrained courts' ability to sanc-
tion.
Instead of imposing an adverse jury instruction as a sanction for spolia-
tion of evidence, courts should allow evidence of spoliation to be admitted
at trial if a reasonable jury could find that spoliation had occurred and if the
spoliation was relevant to a material issue. If a court allows the introduction
of evidence of spoliation at trial, it should also allow argument by attorneys
on whether the jury should infer that the spoliated evidence was unfavorable
to the spoliator. This does not require an adverse inference instruction.
Instead, the court should rely on attorney advocacy and the good sense of
jurors to decide whether spoliation has occurred, and if so, how the proof of
spoliation should affect the outcome of the trial.
. Following this introduction, the Article examines how courts have tradi-
tionally dealt with the spoliation of evidence. Next the Article discusses the
23. See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (S.D.
Tex. 2010) ("Spoliation of evidence-particularly of electronically stored information-has
assumed a level of importance in litigation that raises grave concerns."); Victor Stanley, Inc.
v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 516 (D. Md. 2010) ("Recent decisions, discussed
below, have generated concern throughout the country among lawyers and institutional cli-
ents regarding the lack of a uniform national standard governing when the duty to preserve
potentially relevant evidence commences, the level of culpability required to justify sanc-
tions, the nature and severity of appropriate sanctions, and the scope of the duty to preserve
evidence and whether it is tempered by the same principles of proportionality that
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C) applies to all discovery in civil cases.").
24. See Willoughby et al., supra note 5, at 811 ("In fifty-two cases, courts sanctioned
parties for e-discovery violations by issuing adverse jury instructions. Courts deferred judg-
ment on this issue in another ten cases.").
25. Id. at 803.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) provides for orders directing that designated matters be tak-
en as established for purposes of the action as possible sanctions, but it does not expressly
authorize adverse inference instructions as sanctions.
27. See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.
2002).
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current law on inferences and presumptions under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.
Then the Article provides an analysis of two landmark decisions from
2010 on the spoliation of evidence and adverse inferences. In Pension
Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America
Securities, LLC, Judge Scheindlin imposed an adverse inference instruction
as a sanction for certain parties' grossly negligent conduct. 8 The instruction
included a presumption that the spoliated evidence was both relevant and
would have been favorable to the innocent parties. In Rimkus Consulting
Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, Judge Rosenthal also imposed an adverse infer-
ence instruction as a sanction, but she based the sanction on evidence that
the spoliation was intentional.29 In addition, she framed the jury instruction
as an inference rather than a presumption.30
After the analysis of Pension Committee and Rimkus, the Article urges
courts to rely on attorney advocacy rather than sanctions to address the spo-
liation of evidence in most cases. A brief conclusion follows.
I. TRADITIONAL TREATMENT OF SPOLIATION
While the spoliation of electronic evidence is a fairly recent develop-
ment, courts have been dealing with spoliation of other forms of evidence
for hundreds of years. Spoliation has been described both as threatening the
integrity of the judicial process' and also as commonplace. 32 Spoliation
28. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC,
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
29. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 610 (S.D. Tex.
2010).
30. An inference is a deduction based on logic and experience, but a presumption is a
rule of law. For further discussion of the distinction between an inference and a presumption,
see infra text accompanying notes 113-114.
31. United Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 258-59 (2007) ("Aside
perhaps from perjury, no act serves to threaten the integrity of the judicial process more than
the spoliation of evidence.... [W]hen critical documents go missing, judges and litigants
alike descend into a world of ad hocery and half measures-and our civil justice system
suffers."); Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need
for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 793, 793 (1991) ("Spoliation is an effec-
tive, and, I believe, a growing litigation practice which threatens to undermine the integrity
of civil trial process. It is a form of cheating which blatantly compromises the ideal of the
trial as a search for truth.").
32. See Nesson, supra note 31, at 793 ("It is impossible to know precisely how com-
mon spoliation is today. Interviews and surveys of litigators suggest a prevalent practice.");
Dale A. Oesterle, A Private Litigant's Remedies for an Opponent's Inappropriate Destruc-
tion of Relevant Documents, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1185, 1185 (1983) ("Businesses routinely
destroy documents in order to keep the documents out of the hands of opponents in future
legal proceedings."); Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1218 (2004) ("In fact, according to many judges and practitioners, evidence tampering is
hardly confined to blockbuster events. Documents that should be produced in response to a
discovery request are regularly shredded, altered, or suppressed." (footnote omitted)).
7Fall 2011])
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
became a subject of national attention in 2001 when the Arthur Andersen
accounting firm shredded more than a ton of documents and deleted around
30,000 emails and computer files in response to the SEC investigation of its
client, the Enron Corporation.33
Probably the earliest reported decision involving the spoliation of evi-
dence is Rex v. Arundel,34 from 1617. In Arundel, the Chancery Court
decided that deeds giving good title in particular lands to the defendants
were "very vehemently suspicious to have been suppressed and with-holden
by some under whom the defendants claimed." 3 Consequently, the Chan-
cery Court issued a decree granting the lands to the King until the
defendants produced the missing deeds.
A case from 1722, Armory v. Delamirie,36 involved a chimney sweep-
er's boy who found a jewel and then took it to a goldsmith's shop to
determine what it was. After the goldsmith's apprentice took out the stones
and returned the socket without the stones, the chimney sweeper's boy
brought an action for trover against the goldsmith. To prove damages, the
plaintiff called several jewelers who testified to the value of "a jewel of the
finest water that would fit the socket."37 The trial judge then directed the jury
that unless the defendant produced the actual jewel and showed it not to be
of the finest water, the jurors "should presume the strongest against him, and
make the value of the best jewels the measure of their damages: which they
accordingly did."3 The presumption from the Armory case was incorporated
into "that favorite maxim of the law, omnia presumuntur contra spoliato-
rem,"39 which means "[a]ll presumptions are against one who wrongfully
dispossesses another (a despoiler)."4 0
Wigmore classified spoliation of evidence as a type of conduct that pro-
vides evidence of consciousness of a weak case.4 1 Rather than handling
spoliation through a presumption, Wigmore reasoned that the conduct of a
spoliator gave rise to a powerful inference:
It has always been understood-the inference, indeed, is one of the
simplest in human experience-that a party's falsehood or other
33. See Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good
Corporate Citizenship", 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 1011-12, 1012 n.152 (2002).
34. R v. Arundel, (1617) 80 Eng. Rep. 258 (K.B.); I Hob. 109.
35. Id. at 258.
36. Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B); I Str. 505.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 1 SIR T. WILLES CHITTY ET AL., SMITH'S LEADING CASES 404 (13th ed. 1929)
("The third point decided in this case is an illustration of that favourite maxim of the law,
omnia presumuntur contra spoliatorem; which signifies that if a man, by his own tortious
act, withhold the evidence by the nature of his case would be manifested, every presumption
to his disadvantage will be adopted.").
40. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1857 (9th ed. 2009).
41. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 277 (4th ed.
1979).
[Vol. I18:18
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fraud in the preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrica-
tion or suppression of evidence by bribery or spoliation, and all
similar conduct is receivable against him as an indication of his
consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from
that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the cause's lack
of truth and merit. The inference thus does not necessarily apply to
any specific fact in the cause, but operates, indefinitely though
strongly, against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting his
cause.4 2
Wigmore also described a separate, more specific inference that may
arise from spoliation: that the evidence a party fails to produce was unfavor-
able to that party. Wigmore wrote:
The consciousness indicated by conduct may be, not an indefinite
one affecting the weakness of the cause at large, but a specific one
concerning the defects of a particular element in the cause. The
failure to bring before the tribunal some circumstance, document or
witness, when either the party himself or his opponent claims that
the facts would thereby be elucidated, serves to indicate, as the
most natural inference, that the party fears to do so; and this fear is
some evidence that the circumstance or document or witness, if
brought, would have exposed facts unfavorable to the party. These
inferences, to be sure, cannot fairly be made except upon certain
conditions; and they are also open always to explanation by cir-
cumstances which make some other hypothesis a more natural one
than the party's fear of exposure. But the propriety of such an infer-
ence in general is not doubted.
The nonproduction of evidence that would naturally have been pro-
duced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant permits the
inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party's cause. Ever
since the case of the Chimney Sweeper's Jewel, this has been a rec-
ognized principle.4 3
Wigmore continued that while courts generally recognized some sort of
adverse inference from a party's nonproduction or suppression of docu-
ments or chattels, they were less certain about some aspects of the adverse
inference. First, he observed that spoliation might give rise to a presumption
of law, which would shift the burden of producing evidence to the spolia-
tor 4 4 but it was not clear whether it did.45 Courts also disagreed about
42. Id. § 278 (emphasis in original).
43. Id. § 285 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. § 291.
45. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2524 (4th ed.
1981) ("But that a rule of presumption [for spoliation of evidence] can be predicated is
doubtful.").
Fall 201l] 9
10 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
whether the inference from spoliation was sufficient by itself to prove that
the contents of a missing document were unfavorable, or whether additional
evidence of the contents should be required. While recognizing contrary
authority in the cases, Wigmore concluded that the inference from spoliation
should be sufficient proof that its contents were unfavorable "provided the
opponent, when the identity of the document is disputed, first introduces
some evidence tending to show that the document actually destroyed or
withheld is the one as to whose contents it is desired to draw an inference." 46
Wigmore added that nothing like specific details of contents should be
required, but instead only "such evidence as goes to general marks of identi-
ty."47 In other words, Wigmore would mandate only some evidence of the
general nature of the missing document to support the adverse inference.48
Once there has been proof of spoliation, it is a proper subject of argument
by counsel. 49
The two types of inferences that may be drawn from spoliation are il-
lustrated by Anderson v. Litzenberg. 0 There, the plaintiff was injured when
a tarp covering the load in a dump truck came loose and struck an oncoming
vehicle, causing its driver to lose control, cross the dividing line, and crash
head-on into the plaintiff's pickup truck. After the accident, the owner of the
dump truck discarded its tarp system. The trial judge gave the following jury
instruction, to which the owner of the dump truck objected: "[D]estruction
of evidence by a person gives rise to an inference or presumption unfavora-
ble to spoiler, and, secondly, if the intent was to conceal the nature of the
defect the destruction must be inferred to indicate a weakness in the case."'
In affirming, the appellate court reasoned that since a party would nor-
mally be expected to preserve evidence that was favorable to its case, it was
logical to infer from a failure to preserve particular evidence that the unpre-
served evidence was probably unfavorable. Accordingly, it held that even if
"the jury concluded that [the dump truck owner's] decision to throw away
the tarp was merely the product of innocent mistake, the jury could still pre-
46. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 291.
47. Id.
48. See generally Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[T]he
prejudiced party may be permitted an inference in his favor so long as he has produced some
evidence suggesting that a document or documents relevant to substantiating his claim would
have been included among the destroyed files."); Drew D. Dropkin, Note, Linking the Cul-
pability and Circumstantial Evidence Requirements for the Spoliation Inference, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1803, 1825 (2002) ("[Wigmore's] rule is premised on the rationale that extrinsic evi-
dence of the contents should not be required because, by supposition, the evidence has been
deliberately destroyed or withheld.").
49. 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1807 (4th ed.
1979) ("Where the existence of a material document or witness has appeared in the course of
the testimony and yet the opponent has not produced the witness or document, the failure to
produce is in evidence from the very nature of the situation, and therefore, when relevant,
may be referred to [in argument by counsel]." (citations omitted)).
50. Anderson v. Litzenberg, 694 A.2d 150 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
51. Id. at 155.
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sume that, at the time of the accident, the tarp was in a defective, or other-
wise unfavorable, condition."5 2 The appellate court added that if the jury
concluded that the dump truck owner discarded the tarp with the intent to
conceal that it was defective, it could also infer that the dump truck owner
was conscious that it had a weak case.53
McCormick on Evidence ("McCormick") treats spoliation of evidence
as a form of admission by conduct.54 When a party resorts to spoliation, that
party provides a basis for inferring that the party believes the case could not
be won without destroying evidence. 5 In order for this reasoning to work,
the spoliator must have been either the party or someone connected to the
party. 56 In addition, the circumstances of the spoliation must demonstrate
bad faith because a showing of negligence would not support the inference
that the party was aware of the weakness of the case.57
McCormick questions the probative value of spoliation with respect to
an adverse inference, particularly where the spoliation is not directed to-
wards the suppression of a particular fact. It concludes by noting that some
recent cases have indicated a willingness to rethink the traditionally estab-
lished principles, and that the law appears to be in flux, with the patterns of
the new order not yet clear.
Courts and commentators have identified two rationales for adverse in-
ferences.59 The first is the evidentiary or remedial rationale discussed above.
The other rationale is prophylactic or punitive. As McCormick explains,
52. Id. at 156.
53. Id.
54. KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265 (6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK] ("As might be expected, wrongdoing by the party in connection with its case
amounting to an obstruction of justice is also commonly regarded as an admission by con-
duct.").
55. Id. ("By resorting to wrongful devices, the party is said to provide a basis for be-
lieving that he or she thinks the case is weak and not to be won by fair means, or in criminal
cases that the accused is conscious of guilt.").
56. Id. ("The actor must be connected to the party, or, in the case of a corporation, to
one of its superior officers.").
57. Id. ("Moreover, the circumstances of the act must manifest bad faith. Mere negli-
gence is not enough, for it does not sustain the inference of consciousness of a weak case.").
An influential law review article explains the reasoning behind the adverse inference and the
need for bad faith as follows:
[Spoliation] indicates a belief relevant and detrimental to some feature of his case;
therefore he holds that belief; therefore his case in this feature is defective. But if
the litigant's conduct results only from happy-go-lucky carelessness, and not from
specific motive or intention to achieve a specific end, the whole backbone of the
formula breaks. The necessary showing of belief is lacking.
John MacArthur Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or Re-
lated Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 235 (1935).
58. MCCORMICK, supra note 54.
59. See Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218
(1st Cir. 1982); MCCORMICK, supra note 54; Maguire & Vincent, supra note 57, at 227.
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"[t]he real underpinning of the rule of admissibility may be a desire to im-
pose swift punishment, with a certain poetic justice, rather than concern
over niceties of proof."60
The prophylactic or punitive component has been part of the adverse in-
ference for spoliation from almost the beginning. As Judge (now Justice)
Breyer pointed out in Nation- Wide Check Corp., Inc. v. Forest Hills Distrib-
utors, Inc.,61 the judge in the Armory case instructed the jury to base the
chimney sweeper's damages on the value of jewels "of the finest water" in
order to "presume the strongest" against the goldsmith, as opposed to in-
structing the jury to infer only that the jewels had some value.
Depending on the circumstances, the evidentiary and punitive bases for
adverse inference for spoliation may overlap. A showing that a party used
an "Evidence Eliminator" program to erase computer files shortly after a
court ordered their preservation may provide strong circumstantial evidence
of their probable content62 as well as grounds for punishment of the spolia-
tor.63 The circumstantial evidence of intentional spoliation of evidence
supports both the evidentiary and punitive components for an adverse infer-
ence. In contrast, the negligent loss of computer files would not support an
inference concerning their probable content."
60. MCCORMICK, supra note 54. Professor Nance has noted that this statement was not
in the original edition of McCormick's treatise but was added after his death to subsequent
editions. Dale A. Nance, Adverse Inferences About Adverse Inferences: Restructuring Jurid-
ical Roles for Responding to Evidence Tampering by Parties to Litigation, 90 B.U. L. REV.
1089, 1102 n.48 (2010).
61. Nation- Wide, 692 F.2d at 218.
62. See id. ("The evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the common sense obser-
vation that a party who has notice that a document is relevant to litigation and who proceeds
to destroy the document is more likely to have been threatened by the document than is a
party in the same position who does not destroy the document.").
63. See id. ("Allowing the trier of fact to draw the inference presumably deters parties
from destroying relevant evidence before it can be introduced at trial. The inference also
serves as a penalty, placing the risk of an erroneous judgment on the party that wrongfully
created the risk.").
64. See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 526 (D. Md. 2010)
("For example, an adverse inference instruction makes little logical sense if given as a sanc-
tion for negligent breach of the duty to preserve, because the inference that a party failed to
preserve evidence because it believed that the evidence was harmful to its case does not flow
from mere negligence-particularly if the destruction was of ESI (electronically stored in-
formation) and was caused by the automatic deletion function of a program that the party
negligently failed to disable once the duty to preserve was triggered."); MCCORMICK, supra
note 54, § 265 ("Mere negligence is not enough, for it does not sustain the inference of con-
sciousness of a weak cause."); Maguire & Vincent, supra note 57, at 235 ("[Tlrue implied
admissions arising from 'spoliation' and the like must involve an element of deliberation or
intention, negligence by itself being insufficient."); Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness
and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGs L.J. 621, 638 (1998) ("[I]t is reasonable to make an
adverse inference against [a spoliator] only when that party acted in bad faith, that is, with
the intent to deprive the tribunal of evidence. Only then is there reason to believe that the
evidence suppressed would have been unfavorable to the suppressing party.").
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Under the federal rules governing discovery, sanctions may also give
rise to an adverse inference instruction. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37
authorizes a court to impose a variety of sanctions on a party who fails to
obey an order to provide discovery,"5 including an order to produce docu-
ments that were requested under Rule 34.66 The sanctions include (1)
directing designated facts to be taken as established for purposes of the ac-
tion, (2) prohibiting a party from supporting or opposing designated claims
or defenses, or introducing designated matters in evidence, (3) striking
pleadings in whole or part, (4) staying proceedings, (5) dismissing the ac-
tion, (6) entering a default judgment, (7) holding a party in contempt of
court, and (8) requiring a party to pay reasonable expenses, including attor-
ney fees, caused by its failure to obey the order.6 7
Rule 37 does not expressly provide for an adverse inference instruction
for spoliation, but its list of sanctions is nonexclusive. Also, the rule does
provide for an order directing designated facts to be taken as established for
purposes of the action,'68 which is similar to but even stronger than an ad-
verse inference instruction. Accordingly, it would appear that the rule would
authorize an adverse inference instruction as a sanction for violation of a
court order for production of documents.69
By its terms, Rule 37 applies only to violations of court orders, and thus
does not cover spoliation of evidence when there is no order for production
of documents or before the filing of an action. 70 Rule 34 limits requests for
production to "items in the responding party's possession, custody, or con-
trol,"" and therefore it does not cover items that were destroyed before
service of a request for production. Nevertheless, the courts have recognized
their inherent power to impose sanctions for spoliation of evidence in cir-
cumstances outside of Rule 37 as an aspect of their inherent authority "to
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
66. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
68. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (affirming
order that imposed sanction of deeming personal jurisdiction established); Smith v. Kmart
Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirming instruction for jury to accept as true
unsafe condition of store as sanction for defendant's failure to produce loss control manager
for deposition).
69. See Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc., 189 F.3d 1177, 1181-82, 1184 (10th Cir.
1999) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) authorized jury instruction that it "must pre-
sume" that evidence that party failed to produce would have been unfavorable to the
defendant and favorable to the plaintiff).
70. See Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368
(9th Cir. 1992); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 104 F.R.D. 1t9, 121 n.1
(C.D. Cal. 1985) ("[The defendant] correctly argues that an order to provide or permit dis-
covery must be in existence before Rule 37(b) sanctions may be awarded."); lain D.
Johnson, Federal Courts' Authority to Impose Sanctions for Prelitigation or Pre-order Spo-
liation of Evidence, 156 F.R.D. 313, 318 (1994).
71. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1).
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levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices"72 and "to fashion
an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.""
Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.74 provides an interesting example. The
plaintiff in that case fell asleep while driving his pickup truck at fifty-five
miles per hour and crashed into a tree. He was wearing a seatbelt, but his
airbag failed to deploy and he suffered a back strain on account of the crash.
Soon after the accident, the plaintiff's lawyer sent a letter to the truck's
manufacturer notifying the manufacturer of the accident and the airbag's
failure to deploy. The manufacturer replied to the letter and requested the
location of the vehicle for inspection purposes, but the plaintiff's lawyer did
not respond to the request. Sometime between six months and one year after
the accident, the plaintiff's insurer sold the truck for salvage, and the plain-
tiff had no knowledge of its whereabouts thereafter.75
A little more than six years after the accident, the plaintiff filed a federal
court action against the truck's manufacturer claiming enhanced injury to
his lower back as a result of the airbag's failure to deploy on account of an
alleged manufacturing defect. At the trial, the plaintiff introduced testimony
from an accident reconstruction expert that the plaintiff's truck must have
been moving at more than fifteen miles per hour when it hit the tree. The
expert's testimony was based solely on the accident report and post-accident
photographs of the truck. The expert also testified that generally airbags are
designed to not deploy at speeds less than eight miles per hour, to some-
times deploy at speeds between eight and fourteen miles per hour, and to
always deploy at speeds of fifteen miles per hour or more. The expert con-
cluded that the airbag should have deployed because the plaintiff crashed
into the tree at more than fifteen miles per hour.
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge explained what spoliation was
and instructed the jury that spoliation creates a rebuttable presumption that
evidence not preserved was unfavorable to the party who caused the spolia-
tion. The judge further instructed the jury that if it found that the plaintiff
disposed of the truck before giving the defendant an opportunity to inspect
it, the jury could presume that there was no defect, but the plaintiff could
rebut the presumption. 76 Despite the spoliation instruction, the jury returned
a verdict of $250,000 for the plaintiff.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that dismissal was re-
quired for the plaintiff's spoliation of the evidence and that the spoliation
instruction was insufficient to cure the prejudice to the defendant. The ap-
72. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980) (permitting award of
attorney fees for failure to comply with discovery orders and an order concerning the time
for filing briefs if bad faith was found).
73. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991) (affirming assessment of
attorney fees as sanction against party for bad faith conduct during litigation).
74. Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939 (11 th Cir. 2005).
75. Id. at 940-42.
76. Id. at 943 n.9.
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pellate court acknowledged that because dismissal is the most severe sanc-
tion, it should be ordered only where there is bad faith and lesser sanctions
would not suffice. Still, the court determined that dismissal was warranted
because the condition of the airbag and the truck was critical to the case,
and the defendant was prejudiced by not being given an opportunity to ex-
amine them. The court set out the following five factors to assess whether to
order dismissal as a sanction for spoliation of evidence:
(1) whether the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the destruc-
tion of evidence; (2) whether the prejudice could be cured; (3) the
practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether the plaintiff acted
in good or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse if expert testi-
mony about the evidence was not excluded.77
Similarly, an order of dismissal as a sanction for spoliation was affirmed
in Silvestri v. General Motors Corp.," another airbag case. The Fourth Cir-
cuit decided that although it was not clear whether the spoliation was
negligent or deliberate, dismissal was not an abuse of discretion because the
loss of the airbag evidence was critical to the central issue in the case, and
therefore highly prejudicial to the defendant. The court held that dismissal
for spoliation of evidence would be warranted either if the spoliator's con-
duct was so egregious that it justified forfeiture of the claim, or if the
spoliation substantially prevented the defendant from putting on a defense."
The Flury and Silvestri cases demonstrate the desirability of allowing a
court to impose a harsher sanction than an adverse inference instruction for
spoliation of evidence because in some circumstances, an adverse inference
instruction may not be sufficient to deter spoliation or provide an effective
remedy."o An adverse inference is most appropriate when courts, relying on
their inherent authority, determine that a particular act of spoliation merits a
sanction less severe than dismissal.8'
Although most courts have followed McCormick" in requiring the spo-
liator to act in bad faith before giving an adverse inference instruction,83 the
77. Id. at 945.
78. Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583 (2d Cir. 2001).
79. Id. at 594.
80. See Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 548 (W.D. Okla. 1979) ("A presumption as
to certain evidence is simply not sufficient to protect against [the destruction of evidence].");
Oesterle, supra note 32, at 1238 ("The hostile inferences created by destroying evidence do
not seem to offset the strategic gains achieved by the document destroyer of preventing his
opponent's use of a particularly damaging document or of adding excessive litigation costs
to the opponent's case. Most importantly, the inferences may not be strong enough to coun-
ter an opponent's remaining documents, which are carefully retained because of their
support of the opponent's case.") (emphasis in original).
81. See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.
2002).
82. See MCCORMICK, supra note 54; supra text accompanying note 57.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Laurent, 607 F.3d 895, 902 (1st Cir. 2010) ("In general,
the [adverse inference] instruction usually makes sense only where the evidence permits a
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Second Circuit ruled in Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial
Corp.84 that negligent spoliation would suffice." The Second Circuit based
its decision to allow the use of an adverse inference instruction in cases of
negligent spoliation on the prophylactic rationales of deterrence and retribu-
tion. These rationales were explained in Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines,
Inc.86 as follows:
It makes little difference to the party victimized by the destruction
of evidence whether that act was done willfully or negligently. The
adverse inference provides the necessary mechanism for restoring
the evidentiary balance. The inference is adverse to the destroyer
not because of any finding of moral culpability, but because the risk
that the evidence would have been detrimental rather than favorable
should fall on the party responsible for its loss."'
The court added:
The adverse inference thus acts as a deterrent against even the neg-
ligent destruction of evidence. This is perfectly appropriate:
deterrence is not a function limited to punitive sanctions where
intent has been demonstrated. In the law of torts, for example, dam-
ages for negligence serve to deter such conduct in the future."
finding of bad faith destruction; ordinarily, negligent destruction would not support the logi-
cal inference that the evidence was favorable to the defendant.") (emphasis removed); Mann
v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009) ("In the Eleventh Circuit, 'an ad-
verse inference is drawn from a party's failure to preserve evidence only when the absence of
that evidence is predicated on bad faith."' (quoting Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d
939, 946 (11th Cir. 2005))); Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir.
2005) ("The Fifth Circuit permits an adverse inference against the destroyer of evidence only
upon a showing of 'bad faith' or 'bad conduct."' (quoting King v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 337 F.3d
550, 556 (5th Cir. 2003))); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997)
("The adverse inference must be predicated on the bad faith of the party destroying the rec-
ords."); Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995) ("An adverse
inference about a party's consciousness of the weakness of his case, however, cannot be
drawn merely from his negligent loss or destruction of evidence; the inference requires a
showing that the party knew the evidence was relevant to some issue at trial and that his
willful conduct resulted in its loss or destruction."); Courtney v. Big 0 Tires, Inc., 87 P.3d
930, 933 (Idaho 2003) ("For the loss or destruction of evidence to constitute an admission,
the circumstances must indicate that the evidence was lost or destroyed because the party
responsible for such loss or destruction did not want the evidence available for use by an
adverse party in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. The merely negligent loss of
evidence will not support that inference, nor would the intentional destruction of an item that
a party had no reason to believe had any evidentiary significance at the time it was de-
stroyed.").
84. Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 107-08.
85. Id. at 108.
86. Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, 142 F.R.D. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
87. Id. at 75.
88. Id. at 75 n.3.
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Punishing the negligent spoliation of evidence deters spoliation by im-
posing the consequence of the spoliation on the spoliator, who would
generally be the cheapest cost avoider.9 The spoliator usually has access to
the evidence and can prevent its spoliation through the use of ordinary care.
If the goal of the litigation process is simply to achieve the optimal level of
preservation of evidence, allocating the cost of spoliation onto the spoliator
through an adverse inference instruction could well be appropriate. But the
goal of litigation should be ascertaining the true facts in the case, not effi-
ciently preserving evidence. Therefore, a jury should not be instructed to
draw an inference for the sake of punishing a party unless there is a rea-
sonable logical and evidentiary basis for the court's concluding that the
inference is likely to be true.
For example, in the Turner case, the court ruled that an adverse infer-
ence instruction was not appropriate because there was no evidentiary
support for an adverse inference. It explained:
In order to remedy the evidentiary imbalance created by the de-
struction of evidence, an adverse inference may be appropriate even
in the absence of a showing that the spoliator acted in bad faith.
However, where the destruction was negligent rather than willful,
special caution must be exercised to ensure that the inference is
commensurate with information that was reasonably likely to have
been contained in the destroyed evidence. Where, as here, there is
no extrinsic evidence whatever tending to show that the destroyed
evidence would have been unfavorable to the spoliator, no adverse
inference is appropriate.90
Similarly, the Residential Funding court stated that "the party seeking
an adverse inference must adduce sufficient evidence from which a reason-
able trier of fact could infer that 'the destroyed [or unavailable] evidence
would have been of the nature alleged by the party affected by its destruc-
tion."' 9' Thus, under the Second Circuit precedent, an adverse inference
instruction would be appropriate for negligent spoliation only if there was a
89. See generally GuIoO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135 (1970) ("A pure
market approach to primary accident cost avoidance would require allocation of accident
costs to those acts or activities (or combinations of them) which could avoid the accident
costs most cheaply."); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97
(1972) (arguing that promoting economic efficiency suggests "putting costs on the party or
activity which can most cheaply avoid them"); James E. Ward IV, Note, Rule 11 and Factu-
ally Frivolous Claims-The Goal of Cost Minimization and the Client's Duty to Investigate,
44 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1185 (1991) ("Since the overall goal [of Rule I I] is cost avoidance
and the party filing the suit is presumed to be able to avoid costs most cheaply, the Rule
imposes the duty [to investigate the facts of a claim before pleading] on the filing party.").
90. Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 77.
91. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.
2002).
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reasonable logical and evidentiary basis for the adverse inference. This basis
could be provided by other evidence that would tend to show the destroyed
evidence would have been unfavorable to the spoliator.
The Residential Funding court also stated that bad faith destruction of
evidence provides sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable trier of
fact to infer that the evidence was unfavorable to its destroyer.92 The court
added that a showing of gross negligence would support an adverse infer-
ence in some circumstances. Other intentional or grossly negligent acts that
hinder discovery could support an adverse inference even if those acts did
not actually cause the destruction of the evidence.93
The Second Circuit also stated that the trial court's role with respect to
spoliation was limited to deciding whether sanctions are warranted. 94 The
Second Circuit explained that the trial court's decision should be based on
whether there had been sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that
the spoliated material would have been unfavorable to the spoliator. It was
then up to the jury to determine whether the spoliated material was actually
unfavorable to the spoliator.95 As a consequence, the jury would still be free
to give an adverse inference instruction little weight unless it decided that
there was a logical basis for inferring that the spoliated material was actual-
ly unfavorable to the spoliator.
In the absence of bad faith, there is no logical connection between spo-
liation and an inference that the spoliated material was unfavorable to the
spoliator. The spoliator would need to have destroyed the material for an
improper purpose in order for an adverse inference to have much force.96
Therefore, without bad faith or other evidence of the content of the spoliated
material, a jury would not be likely to draw an adverse inference from spoli-
ation despite receiving an adverse inference instruction. Consequently, even
though Residential Funding authorizes an adverse inference instruction in
the Second Circuit as a sanction for grossly negligent spoliation, the sanc-
tion ought to have no effect in most cases that do not involve bad faith.
Negligent spoliation cases would require some other evidence of the content
of the spoliated material on which the jury could base an inference that the
spoliated material was unfavorable to the spoliator.
Of course, the culpability surrounding spoliation is almost never black
and white. There will often be an evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
infer that spoliation was in bad faith rather than negligent or grossly negli-
92. Id.
93. Id. at 109-10, 113.
94. Id. at 109 n.4.
95. Id. ("Although the issue of whether evidence was destroyed with a 'culpable state
of mind' is one for a court to decide in determining whether the imposition of sanctions is
warranted, whether the materials were in fact unfavorable to the culpable party is an issue of
fact to be determined by the jury.").
96. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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gent. 97 For example, in Reilly v. Natwest Markets Group Inc.,98 which the
Residential Funding court relied on in holding that gross negligence for
spoliation by itself was sufficient to support a finding that the spoliated ma-
terial was unfavorable to the spoliator,99 the evidence would easily have
supported a finding of bad faith as well. In Reilly, an employee brought a
breach of contract action against his former employer. The defendant-
employer at first refused to produce certain paper files that allegedly showed
the plaintiff had been involved in various transactions for which the defend-
ant had never compensated him. The defendant claimed that it did not have
the files, but then delivered them to the plaintiff's counsel at 3 p.m. on the
Friday before the Monday trial date.
At the final pretrial conference that Friday, the trial judge characterized
the defendant's failure to produce the files earlier as bordering on willful
misconduct and ruled that an adverse inference instruction was warranted.'*
In addition, the plaintiff was able to show that the defendant had sanitized
the files because the files that the defendant produced contained only public-
ly available documents and did not include other material documents the
plaintiff alleged had been in the files previously.o'0 At a hearing after the
trial, the trial judge declined to impose additional sanctions and ruled that
the defendant had been grossly negligent in searching for the files and fail-
ing to assure their integrity.'02
On appeal, the Second Circuit decided that the trial judge had not
abused his discretion by giving the adverse inference instruction. The de-
fendant had demonstrated "at least the gross negligence" found by the trial
judge in light of the defendant's failure to produce the files until the elev-
enth hour and its sanitizing of the files.'0o Because the defendant had not
produced critical files until the eve of trial and had removed particular doc-
uments from the files, a reasonable jury could have found bad faith in Reilly
and inferred (from the finding of bad faith) that the defendant had also re-
moved other unfavorable documents from the files.
Thus, while a trial judge in the Second Circuit could give an adverse in-
ference instruction based on a judicial finding of gross negligence, a jury
might determine that the spoliation was the result of bad faith rather than
gross negligence. The jury could then infer, based on the spoliator's bad
97. Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108 ("[A] 'case-by-case approach to the failure
to produce relevant evidence' was appropriate because '[s]uch failures occur "along a con-
tinuum of fault-ranging from innocence through the degrees of negligence to with
intentionality."' " (quoting Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988))).
98. Reilly v. Natwest Mkts. Grp., 181 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 1999).
99. Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 109.
100. Reilly, 181 F.3d at 261.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 262.
103. Id. at 268.
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faith and other evidence of the contents of the spoliated material, that the
spoliated material was unfavorable to the spoliator.
One of the leading cases on the use of an adverse inference instruction
as a sanction for the spoliation of electronic evidence is Judge Scheindlin's
decision in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.'" The plaintiff sought emails
from the defendant in her gender discrimination in employment and retalia-
tion lawsuit. Both the in-house and outside counsel for the defendant issued
a litigation hold soon after the plaintiff filed her initial charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), requesting that the par-
ties preserve all data. The defense attorneys circulated the notice to many of
the key players who worked with the plaintiff and were likely to have writ-
ten or received emails that the plaintiff would later request. Nevertheless, a
number of the key players failed to retain emails that related to the plain-
tiff's claims, and the court decided that the defendant's counsel failed to
properly oversee the preservation process in several significant ways.'o
Many of the deleted emails were eventually recovered from the defendant's
backup tapes or other sources, but they were not produced until twenty-two
months after the first request. In addition, because some of the defendant's
backup tapes had been recycled, it was clear that some emails were irre-
trievably lost. It was impossible, however, to tell how many emails were lost
or what their contents were.106
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the contents of the recycled tapes
would have been at least as favorable to the plaintiff as the emails she had
been able to obtain from the defendant, because of (1) the dates that the re-
cycled backup tapes covered, (2) the content of emails recovered from other
sources, and (3) the fact that the defendant's key players willfully deleted
the emails.107 The court emphasized that it was imposing the sanction due to
the willful deletion of the emails by the defendant's employees rather than
for the negligent loss of the backup tapes. 0 The court stated that it would
give the following adverse inference instruction at trial:
You have heard that UBS failed to produce some of the e-mails sent
or received by UBS personnel in August and September 2001.
Plaintiff has argued that this evidence was in defendants' control
and would have proven facts material to the matter in controversy.
If you find that UBS could have produced this evidence, and that
the evidence was within its control, and that the evidence would
have been material in deciding facts in dispute in this case, you are
104. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y.
2004). This was the fifth published opinion in the case. Id. at 424 & n.5.
105. Id. at 435.
106. Id. at 427.
107. Id. at 437.
108. Id. at 437 n.99.
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permitted, but not required, to infer that the evidence would have
been unfavorable to UBS.
In deciding whether to draw this inference, you should consider
whether the evidence not produced would merely have duplicated
other evidence already before you. You may also consider whether
you are satisfied that UBS's failure to produce this information was
reasonable. Again, any inference you decide to draw should be
based on all of the facts and circumstances in this case.'09
When imposing an adverse inference as a sanction, some courts have
treated it as a presumption,"o while others treat it only as an inference."'
One court recently decided that it should be treated as either a presumption
or an inference depending on the nature of the spoliation." 2 The next sec-
tion discusses the distinctions between inferences and presumptions and
their current operation in the federal system.
I. PRESUMPTIONS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 301
Both presumptions and inferences are used for proving material facts
from the evidence presented at trial. An inference is based on logic and ex-
perience, and it may be defined as "a conclusion drawn from known or
assumed facts or statements."' '3 In contrast, a presumption is a rule of law
that shifts the burden of proof on an issue from one party to another. It may
be defined as requiring that "when a basic fact is found to exist, the pre-
sumed fact is assumed to exist until the nonexistence of the presumed fact is
determined.""14
109. Id. at 439-40. The court adapted this jury instruction from 4 LEONARD B. SAND ET
AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONs 75-77 (2004). Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 440
n.120.
110. See Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 943 n.9, 945; Knowlton v.
Teltrust Phones, Inc., 189 F.3d 1177, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999). See also Armory v. Delamirie,
(1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.); I Str. 505 (directing the jury to "presume the strongest"
against the goldsmith if he did not produce the jewel).
111. See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 620, 646
(S.D. Tex. 2010); Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 381 (D. Conn. 2007); Zubu-
lake V, 229 F.R.D. at 439.
112. See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.,
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456,470 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
113. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007); see also
CAL. EVID. CODE § 600(b) ("An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and rea-
sonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the
action."); David W. Louisell, Construing Rule 301: Instructing the Jury on Presumptions in
Civil Actions and Proceedings, 63 VA. L. REv. 281, 290 (1977) ("An inference is a deduc-
tion, warranted by human reason and experience, that the trier of fact may make on the basis
of established facts-a process of reasoning from premise to conclusion without the directive
force of a rule of law, which characterizes a presumption.").
114. UNIF. R. EviD. 301; see also CAL. EvID. CODE § 600(a) ("A presumption is an
assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found
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McCormick characterizes a "'presumption' as the slipperiest of the
family of legal terms, except for its first cousin, 'burden of proof.' "I" The
term "burden of proof" is ambiguous because it comprises two separate
burdens: the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion."'I
The burden of producing evidence refers to the requirement to put on a pri-
ma facie case so that the judge will allow the case to reach the jury. If a
party with the burden of producing evidence fails to present sufficient evi-
dence for a reasonable jury to find for that party, the judge may grant a
motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). 117
In contrast, the burden of persuasion refers to what the jury should do if
it determines that the weight of the evidence from each side is evenly
matched. The jury should be instructed that if evidence on an issue is exact-
ly equal, the jury should resolve the tie against the party who has the burden
of persuasion on that issue." 8 The effect of presumptions on burdens of
proof has been debated by scholars and in the courts for over a hundred
years, and the debate continues.
The predominant view is probably the "bursting bubble" or Thayer-
Wigmore theory,"'9 which applies presumptions only to the burden of pro-
ducing evidence but not to the burden of persuasion. The alternative view,
known as the Morgan-Maguire theory, 20 gives presumptions greater effect
by applying them both to the burden of producing evidence and to the
burden of persuasion.
Assume that a party who initially has the burden of proving Fact A of-
fers proof of Fact B, and there is a presumption that Fact A is presumed if
Fact B (the basic fact) is proved. Under the "bursting bubble" theory, the
party satisfies the burden of producing evidence with respect to Fact A with
the assistance of the presumption by offering proof of Fact B. In addition,
the presumption shifts the burden of producing evidence with respect to
Fact A to the opposing party.
The consequences of shifting the burden of producing evidence to the
opposing party are that unless the opposing party offers evidence rebutting
Fact A, the court will determine Fact A against the opposing party and direct
the jury accordingly. Moreover, if Fact A resolves the case, the court may
or otherwise established in the action. A presumption is not evidence."); MCCORMICK, Supra
note 54, § 342 ("[A] presumption is a standardized practice, under which certain facts are
held jo call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other facts.").
115. MCCORMICK, supra note 54, § 342.
116. Id. § 336; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 45, §§ 2485, 2487.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
118. MCCORMICK, supra note 54, § 336.
119. See JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAw 380-84 (1898).
120. This view was recommended by Professors Morgan and Maguire in Edmund M.
Morgan & John M. Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARv. L. REV.
909, 913 (1937).
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grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of the party benefitting from the
presumption. On the other hand, if the opposing party satisfies the burden of
producing evidence by offering evidence against Fact A, "the rule of pre-
sumption has vanished" 2' because the presumption does not affect the
burden of persuasion. At the end of the trial, the judge should instruct the
jury that the party with the initial burden of persuasion has the burden of
persuasion with respect to Fact A, and there is no need to inform the jury of
the presumption.
Professors Morgan and Maguire criticized the "bursting bubble" theory
for giving too little effect to presumptions.122 They noted that the policy rea-
sons for presumptions are the same as those for allocating the burden of
persuasion, and they urged that presumptions should shift both the burden of
producing evidence and the burden of persuasion.123
The "bursting bubble" theory was adopted in the American Law Insti-
tute's Model Code of Evidence,124 but the greater weight of scholarly
opinion, including McCormick 25  and Louisell,12 6  supported the
Morgan-Maguire theory. The Uniform Rules of Evidence'27 also adopted the
Morgan-Maguire theory. More notably, the version of the Federal Rules of
Evidence that the Advisory Committee proposed and the Supreme Court
approved also chose the Morgan-Maguire theory. As submitted to Congress,
Rule 301 provided: "In all cases not otherwise provided for by Act of Con-
gress or by these rules a presumption imposes on the party against whom it
is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact
is more probable than its existence." 28 The accompanying Advisory Com-
mittee Note stated that Rule 301 was rejecting the "bursting bubble" theory
because it gave too little effect to presumptions.129
The Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee
then amended the proposed rule by limiting it to civil actions and also at-
tempting to take an intermediate position between the "bursting bubble" and
Morgan-Maguire theories.13 0 The Subcommittee Note explained that under
121. THAYER, supra note 119, at 346, quoted in 9 WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 2487.
122. Morgan & Maguire, supra note 120.
123. Id.
124. See MODEL RULE EvID. 704(2) (1942).
125. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 317 (1954)
("Accordingly, while the judge should be conceded a reasonable discretion whether or not to
instruct the jury upon a given presumption arising in the case, it seems that the normal form
of such instruction if one is given should place the burden on the opponent of overcoming
the presumption by the preponderance of the evidence.").
126. See Louisell, supra note 113, at 283, 320-21.
127. See UNiF. R. EviD. 301.
128. See FED. R. EvID. 301.
129. Id. advisory committee's note.
130. The Subcommittee's amendment provided:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress
or by these rules a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed
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its intermediate position "a presumption does not vanish upon the
introduction of contradicting evidence, and does not change the burden of
persuasion; instead [it] is merely deemed sufficient evidence of the fact pre-
sumed to be considered by the jury or other finder of fact."' 3' The Senate
criticized the House version's treatment of presumptions as evidence, saying
that it would be confusing to juries to weigh presumptions against evi-
dence.13 2 The Senate therefore deleted the provision in the House bill that
treated presumptions as evidence and adopted the following version of Rule
301:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by
Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to
such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersua-
sion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it
was originally cast. 33
Finally, the Conference Committee adopted the Senate version. 34 The con-
sequence was that Congress wound up rejecting the Morgan-Maguire theory
and adopting the "bursting bubble" theory in its place.135
The Conference Report accompanying Rule 301 included the following
statements:
If the adverse party offers no evidence contradicting the presumed
fact, the court will instruct the jury that if it finds the basic facts, it
may presume the existence of the presumed fact. If the adverse par-
ty does offer evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the court
cannot instruct the jury that it may presume the existence of the
the burden of going forward with the evidence, and, even though met with contra-
dicting evidence, a presumption is sufficient proof of the fact presumed to be
considered by the trier of the facts.
Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R., 93rd Cong. 364 (1973).
131. Id. subcommittee note; H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 7 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7081.
132. S. REP. No. 93-1227, at 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7056.
133. FED. R. EvID. 301.
134. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7099.
The Federal Rules of Evidence were restyled in 2011. FED. R. EvID. 301 reads:
In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party
against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing evidence to
rebut the presumption. But this rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which
remains on the party who had it originally.
135. See McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 287-88 (3rd Cir. 2006)
("We have interpreted Rule 301 to express the Thayer-Wigmore "bursting bubble" theory of
presumptions.... This view of Rule 301 is widely accepted.").
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presumed fact from proof of the basic facts. The court may, howev-
er, instruct the jury that it may infer the existence of the presumed
fact from proof of the basic facts.'16
Professor Louisell has pointed out that the first two sentences quoted above
appear to confuse presumptions with inferences, and they should be correct-
ed by substituting "must find" for "may presume."' 37
An inference permits a conclusion to be deduced from the proof of a
fact, but a presumption requires a finding of the presumed fact from the
proof of a basic fact unless the presumed fact is rebutted."' Thus, a pre-
sumption would require a court to find the presumed fact if the basic fact
was proved in the absence of evidence to rebut the presumed fact, and it
should instruct the jury accordingly.139 If there was a jury issue concerning
the existence of a basic fact, however, and there was no evidence to rebut
the presumed fact, the jury would have to be instructed that it was required
to find the existence of the presumed fact only if it determined that the basic
fact existed.4 o Lastly, if there was evidence rebutting the presumed fact, the
effect of the presumption would vanish under the "bursting bubble" theo-
ry of Rule 301, and the jury would be instructed concerning the burden of
persuasion as it existed in the absence of the presumption. 4' There would
be no need to tell the jury about presumptions at all, and it probably
would be less confusing for the court to avoid mentioning presumptions in
136. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7099.
137. See Louisell, supra note 113, at 289, 319; see also Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions
in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IoWA L. REV. 843, 861 n.90 (1981) ("Clearly, the court
should instruct the jury that it must find the presumed fact."). But see 21B CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
§ 5127 (2d ed. 2005) (following language in Conference Report verbatim).
138. See I JACK B. WEINSTEIN, MARGARET A. BERGER & JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 301.02[1] (2010) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN] ("An infer-
ence is distinguished from a presumption in that in an inference, the existence of Fact B may
be deduced from Fact A by the ordinary rules of reasoning and logic whereas in a presump-
tion, the existence of Fact B must be assumed because of a rule of law." (emphasis omitted));
Louisell, supra note 113, at 290 ("By definition, a presumption is a required conclusion in
the absence of adequate countervailing evidence.").
139. See Louisell, supra note 113, at 308-09.
140. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 n.3 (1993) ("If the finder of
fact answers affirmatively-if it finds that the [basic fact] is supported by a preponderance
of the evidence-it must find the existence of the presumed fact . . . and must, therefore,
render a verdict for the plaintiff." (emphasis omitted)); Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) ("If the trier of fact believes the plaintiffs evidence, and if
the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the
plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case."); WEINSTEIN, supra note 138,
§ 301.04; Louisell, supra note 113, at 309. Professor Louisell called this a conditional in-
struction. Id.
141. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 138, § 301.04; Louisell, supra note 113, at 309. See
generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 153 (2000) (hold-
ing that the case was properly submitted to jury after presumption was rebutted).
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jury instructions.14 2 Depending on the case, though, it may be helpful for
the court to give an inference instruction that parallels the presumption.143
The operation of presumptions under Rule 301 is illustrated by St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.'" In an action against an employer for inten-
tional racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,145 the plaintiff relied on the presumption that if an employee estab-
lishes a prima facie case of discrimination, then it is presumed that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.146 Once the em-
ployee satisfies the requirements for the presumption by establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of producing evidence of a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's actions shifts to the
employer.147
The employer in St. Mary's satisfied this burden by introducing evi-
dence of two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its demotion and
subsequent discharge of the employee. The trial court decided that these
reasons were not the real reasons for the employer's actions, but neverthe-
less the trial court ruled that the employee had not satisfied his burden of
proving that the employer unlawfully discriminated against him. The Su-
preme Court affirmed, holding that once the employer rebutted the
presumption, the presumption simply dropped out of the picture because it
had fulfilled its role under Rule 301 of forcing the employer to provide
some sort of a response to the prima facie case presented by the employ-
ee.148 The Court also held that the determination of whether the employer
satisfied its burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption should
not involve a credibility assessment. If the employer offered any "evidence
which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondis-
criminatory reason for the adverse action," 49 the presumption was rebutted
and the employee had the burden of proving that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against him.
The next section examines two recent cases dealing with spoliation of
evidence. In one, 50 the court imposed the sanction of a presumption against
142. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 138, § 301.04; Louisell, supra note 113, at 309. See
generally Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532, 540-41 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The tech-
nical elements of the presumptions and shifting burdens have significant potential to confuse
juries."); Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d I19, 127 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Instructing the
jury on the [basic facts], presumptions, and the shifting burden of proof is unnecessary and
confusing.").
143. WEINSTEIN, supra note 138, § 301.04; Louisell, supra note 13, at 309-11.
144. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 511.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
146. The Supreme Court created this presumption in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506.
147. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506-07.
148. Id. at 510-ll.
149. Id. at 509.
150. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC,
685 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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parties who were grossly negligent in failing to produce electronic evidence.
The presumption was that the missing evidence was relevant and the oppos-
ing parties were prejudiced as a result.'"' In the other case,'52 the court
imposed an adverse inference instruction as a sanction against parties for
intentionally and in bad faith deleting emails that were relevant to the op-
posing party's claims.'5 3
III. Two APPROACHES TO SANCTIONS FOR SPOLIATION
OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION
Two distinguished federal judges issued landmark opinions in 2010 that
took differing approaches to the spoliation of electronically stored infor-
mation. In Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v.
Banc of America Securities, LLC,1' Judge Scheindlin set out an elaborate
framework for selecting from among various forms of adverse inference
instructions based on the egregiousness of the spoliator's conduct.' 5 In con-
trast, in Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata,'" Judge Rosenthal
chose to instruct the jury that it should decide whether the defendants inten-
tionally deleted emails to prevent their use in litigation, and if so, whether to
infer that the lost information would have been unfavorable to them.'
Some of the differences between the two decisions may be attributable
to the different factual contexts of the cases and to the federal courts' loca-
tions in different circuits,' but the decisions also reflect different
approaches to adverse inference instructions.
A. Pension Committee of the University of Montreal
Pension Plan v. Banc of America
Pension Committee arose out of an action by ninety-six investors for
federal securities and New York common law fraud against two British Vir-
gin Island hedge funds (the "Lancer Funds") and their administrators and
151. Id. at 478.
152. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D. Tex.
2010).
153. Id. at 644, 646.
154. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456.
155. Id. at 463-79.
156. 688 F. Supp. 2d at 598.
157. Id. at 620.
158. The Second and Fifth Circuits differ on whether an adverse inference instruction
should be imposed as a sanction for the negligent spoliation of evidence. Compare Residen-
tial Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) ("The sanction
of an adverse inference may be appropriate in some cases involving the negligent destruction
of evidence because each party should bear the risk of its own negligence."), with Vick v.
Tex. Emp't Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Mere negligence is not enough,
for it does not sustain an inference of consciousness of a weak case.").
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officers.159 The Lancer Management Group ("Lancer") managed the Lancer
Funds along with Lancer's principal, Michael Lauer ("Lauer"). The plain-
tiffs alleged that they lost nearly all of the $580 million they invested in the
Lancer Funds between 1997 and 2002 on account of a fraudulent scheme
known as "marking the close."' The scheme involved the initial purchase
for the Lancer Funds of large stakes in thinly-traded stocks'6' followed by
purchases of additional shares of those stocks shortly before the end of
the Lancer Funds' reporting periods at significantly higher prices. 6 2 Pur-
chasing the additional shares at the end of the reporting periods would
artificially raise the closing prices of the stocks to enable the Lancer
Funds to report artificially high net asset values and generate large fees
for Lancer and Lauer.
The case was filed in the Southern District of Florida on February 12,
2004. It was transferred to the Southern District of New York on October
25, 2005,163 where it was assigned to Judge Scheindlin. The defendants filed
motions to dismiss the complaint in June 2004, and this resulted in the issu-
ance of a stay of discovery pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act' that lasted until February 2007. The defendants made their
first discovery requests in May 2007 and began taking depositions of the
plaintiffs on August 30, 2007.
In response to the defendants' dissatisfaction with the plaintiffs' docu-
ment production efforts, the court ordered thirteen of the plaintiffs'65 to
submit declarations regarding their efforts to preserve and produce docu-
ments. Plaintiffs' counsel spent 910 hours questioning the plaintiffs'
employees, searching for documents, and drafting the declarations, which
they submitted in the first half of 2008. The declarations described the steps
the plaintiffs took to locate and preserve documents relating to the Lancer
Funds when they retained counsel in late 2003 or early 2004, and most of
the declarations discussed the plaintiffs' compliance with a second search
request in late 2007 or early 2008. The declarants all stated that they be-
lieved their companies had located, preserved, and produced all the
159. 685 F. Supp. 2d at 462 & n.3.
160. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC,
446 F. Supp. 2d 163, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
161. Thinly traded stocks are shares that usually have few buyers and sellers and there-
fore are subject to wide swings in price when large purchases or sales are made. See United
States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 583 n.5 (6th Cir. 2007).
162. 446 F. Supp. 2d at 172.
163. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
164. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(b)(1); 78u-4(b)(3)(B). The Act provides that
during the pendency of a stay of discovery, the parties are required to "treat all documents
... in [their] custody or control . . . that are relevant to the allegations, as if they were the
subject of a continuing request for production of documents from an opposing party under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. §§ 77z-l(b)(2), 78u-4(b)(3)(C)(i).
165. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 462 n.3 ("Although there are ninety-six plain-
tiffs in this action, only thirteen are relevant for this motion.").
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documents relating to the Lancer Funds in their possession at the time of the
2003 and 2007 searches, and that the companies had not discarded or de-
stroyed any of those documents after the specific dates set out in the
declarations.
Nevertheless, the defendants were able to identify at least 311 docu-
ments that twelve of the thirteen plaintiffs should have produced but did not.
The defendants also claimed that almost all of the declarations were false
and misleading or, alternately, were executed by declarants who did not
have personal knowledge of their contents.' 66 The defendants sought a varie-
ty of sanctions against the plaintiffs for spoliation of evidence, including
dismissal, various types of adverse inference instructions, and monetary
sanctions.167
The Pension Committee opinion began by defining various levels of
culpability in the discovery context, then assigning different burdens of
proof and sanctions depending on the particular level of culpability. Next
Judge Scheindlin applied this analytic framework to the facts of the case.
She also specified the adverse inference instruction that she was going to
use with respect to the plaintiffs that she found were grossly negligent.
Drawing an analogy from the law of torts, Judge Scheindlin defined the
levels of culpability in the context of discovery misconduct as negligence,
gross negligence, and willfulness. While allowing that these terms describe
a continuum,'16 she assigned specific boundaries based on "standards [that]
have been set by years of judicial decisions analyzing allegations of mis-
conduct and reaching a determination as to what a party must do to meet its
obligation to participate meaningfully and fairly in the discovery phase of a
judicial proceeding." 69 Nevertheless, Judge Scheindlin recognized that de-
termining the level of culpability for discovery misconduct was a judgment
call that could not be done precisely, and that different judges might deter-
mine the level of culpability differently.
Judge Scheindlin categorized "[a] failure to preserve evidence resulting
in the loss or destruction of relevant information" as negligence in the dis-
covery context.o7 1 She noted that negligence could also arise from a failure
to collect evidence or sloppy review of evidence that resulted in the loss or
destruction of evidence.' 7' She also gave the following additional examples
of negligence in the discovery context: failure to obtain records of any
166. Id. at 473-74.
167. Id. at 469-71.
168. See id. at 469-71.
169. Id. at 464.
170. Id. ("A failure to preserve evidence resulting in the loss or destruction of relevant
information is surely negligent, and, depending on the circumstances, may be grossly negli-
gent or willful.").
171. Id. at 465 ("Once again, depending on the extent of the failure to collect evidence,
or the sloppiness of the review, the resulting loss or destruction of evidence is surely negli-
gent, and, depending on the circumstances may be grossly negligent or willful.").
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employees who were involved with the issues that were raised in the litiga-
tion or anticipated litigation; failure to take all appropriate measures to
preserve electronically stored information; and failure to assess the accuracy
and validity of selected search terms.'72
Referring to her prior opinions in Zubulake,173 Judge Scheindlin stated
that "the failure to issue a written litigation hold [after the duty to preserve
evidence has attached] constitutes gross negligence because that failure is
likely to result in the destruction of relevant information." 74 She also indi-
cated that the following examples of conduct after the duty to preserve
evidence has attached constituted gross negligence: failure to collect records
from key players; deletion of email; failure to preserve backup tapes if they
were the only sources of relevant information or if they related to key play-
ers and the information from those players is no longer readily accessible;
and failure to collect information from files of former employees that re-
mained in a party's possession, custody, or control. 7 1
Lastly, Judge Scheindlin classified "the intentional destruction of rele-
vant records, either paper or electronic, after the duty to preserve has
attached" as willful misconduct.176 She said that willful misconduct could
also include the failure to collect records from key players as well as the
destruction of email or certain backup tapes after the duty to preserve at-
tached. 1
Judge Scheindlin then explained that a court should impose the least
harsh of the sanctions that were warranted as a remedy for discovery mis-
conduct.178 She decided that the most extreme sanction of dismissal or a
default judgment, which would terminate the case, was justified only for the
most egregious types of misconduct, such as perjury, tampering with evi-
dence, or burning, shredding, or wiping out computer hard drives to
intentionally destroy evidence.179
Judge Scheindlin reasoned that the next level of sanctions for spoliation
of evidence would be some form of an adverse inference instruction with its
harshness calibrated to the egregiousness of the spoliator's conduct. 8 She
said that the harshest form of instruction would be for willful or bad faith
misconduct, and it would direct the jury that certain facts were deemed ad-
mitted and accepted as true. The next harshest form would be for willful or
172. Id.
173. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
174. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC,
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 471.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 464.
177. Id. at 465.
178. Id. at 470.
179. Id. at 469.
180. Id. at 470.
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reckless misconduct, and it would be a mandatory presumption that would
be rebuttable. The least harsh form would permit, but not require, the jury to
presume that the missing evidence was both relevant and unfavorable to the
spoliating party. The instruction would also state that if the jury made this
presumption, the jury should then consider rebuttal evidence from the spoli-
ating party and finally decide whether to draw an adverse inference against
the party.1 "'
Judge Scheindlin also discussed which party should bear the burden of
proof with respect to spoliated evidence and the relationship of the burden
of proof to sanctions. She determined that for the most severe sanctions of
dismissal, preclusion, and adverse inference instructions, the court must
consider not only the conduct of the spoliating party, but also the relevance
of the missing evidence and whether the innocent party suffered prejudice
as a result of the spoliation.
Judge Scheindlin declared that if the spoliating party acted in bad faith
or with gross negligence, relevance and prejudice may be presumed. On the
other hand, if the spoliating party was only negligent, the innocent party
would have the burden of proving both relevance and prejudice for the court
to impose a severe sanction, such as an adverse inference instruction, on the
spoliating party.'82 Finally, Judge Scheindlin ruled that "[w]hen the spoliat-
ing party's conduct is sufficiently egregious to justify a court's imposition of
a presumption of relevance and prejudice, or when the spoliating party's
conduct warrants permitting the jury to make such a presumption, the bur-
den then shifts to the spoliating party to rebut that presumption."' 3 If the
spoliating party was able to rebut the presumption of prejudice by showing
that the innocent party had access to the missing evidence that was allegedly
destroyed, or the evidence would not support the innocent party's claims or
defenses, no jury instruction would be warranted, but the court could still
impose a monetary sanction.' 84
After announcing these principles, Judge Scheindlin proceeded to apply
them to the complex facts of her case. She began by determining the date
when plaintiffs' duty to preserve evidence first arose. Although the case was
originally filed in Florida on February 12, 2004,185 she decided that the
plaintiffs' duty to preserve evidence arose nearly a year earlier in April
2003.86 Two of the plaintiffs had retained counsel in March 2003 on ac-
count of the collapse of the Lancer Funds,'8 7 one of the plaintiffs filed a
complaint with the Financial Services Commission of the British Virgin
181. Id. at 470-71.
182. Id. at 467-68.
183. Id. at 468-69.
184. Id. at 469.
185. Id. at 473.
186. Id. at 475.
187. See id. at 472 n.57.
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Islands on March 23, 2003,188 and Lancer filed for bankruptcy on April 16,
2003.189 The court reasoned that because the plaintiffs were all sophisticated
investors, they should have reasonably anticipated litigation when these
events occurred and begun to preserve evidence.190
Judge Scheindlin next recounted the actions that the plaintiffs took to
preserve evidence after April 2003. The plaintiffs retained their counsel in
October or November 2003. Soon afterwards, plaintiffs' counsel contacted
plaintiffs by telephone and email instructing them to begin document collec-
tion and preservation. Judge Scheindlin ruled that the instruction from
plaintiffs' counsel did not satisfy the standard for a litigation hold, though,
because it did not direct the plaintiffs' employees to preserve all relevant
documents and counsel did not properly monitor the preservation of docu-
ments.191 The plaintiffs did not issue a written litigation hold until 2007.192
By cross-referencing documents they obtained from the plaintiffs and
other sources, the defendants were able to identify 311 documents that the
plaintiffs should have produced in discovery but did not. Most of these doc-
uments were created after April 2003, when the duty to preserve arose, but
some were created before then. It was not clear when the 311 documents
had been destroyed. Documents that were created before April 2003 might
not have been in the plaintiffs' possession, custody, or control when the duty
to preserve arose in April 2003. Documents created after April 2003 surely
were destroyed after the duty to preserve arose, however.193
Judge Scheindlin concluded that it was likely that most of these docu-
ments had been destroyed before the case was transferred from the Southern
District of Florida to the Southern District of New York in 2005 because of
the plaintiffs' failure to institute a written litigation hold.194 She noted that
while the Southern District of New York had established a written litigation
hold requirement in 2004, the Southern District of Florida did not adopt a
written litigation hold requirement until 2007.195 Judge Scheindlin ruled that
if the defendants had been able to prove that the plaintiffs had destroyed any
of the documents after the case had been transferred to the Southern District
of New York in 2005, dismissal of the action would have been justified, but
they had not done so.196
Judge Scheindlin decided that none of the plaintiffs had engaged in
willful discovery misconduct, and that their conduct before the case was
transferred to the Southern District of New York in 2005 was best character-
188. Id.
189. Id. at 462.
190. Id. at 475.
191. See id. at 473.
192. See id. at 474.
193. See id. at 476.
194. Id. at 476-77.
195. Id. at 477 & n.90.
196. See id. at 476-77.
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ized as either grossly negligent or negligent.197 She described a wide variety
of discovery misconduct for the thirteen plaintiffs. It included conducting
severely deficient searches; deleting electronic documents; destroying back-
up tapes that potentially contained documents of key players that were not
otherwise available; failing to collect and preserve documents of key play-
ers; delegating search efforts without supervision from management;
delayed production of documents; submitting misleading or inaccurate dec-
larations to the court concerning their efforts to preserve and produce
documents; failing to search a personal digital assistant ("PDA"); and fail-
ing to search backup tapes for relevant material that was not produced and
either was shown to have existed or should have existed.'"9 Judge Scheindlin
concluded that the misconduct of six of the thirteen plaintiffs fit within the
standard for gross negligence, while the others were only negligent.'99
The sanctions that Judge Scheindlin imposed on the plaintiffs turned on
whether she found them grossly negligent or negligent. Even though the
defendants were able to identify 311 documents that the plaintiffs had not
produced, Judge Scheindlin ruled that the defendants were not prejudiced
by the plaintiffs' failure to produce those documents because the defendants
had obtained them from other sources.2"0 Judge Scheindlin also ruled that
there must have been other documents besides the 311 documents the de-
fendants had obtained from other sources that the plaintiffs had not
produced.201
Judge Scheindlin acknowledged that it was impossible to know the
number or substance of the documents that she ruled had been lost or de-
stroyed, and therefore there was no way to determine whether the lost or
destroyed documents would have been favorable to the defendants. 202 Nev-
ertheless, she concluded that the defendants had satisfied their limited
burden of proving that the lost or destroyed documents would have been
relevant203 because they had been created during the critical time period204
197. Id. at 477-78. In addition, because the duty to issue a written litigation hold was
not clearly established in the Southern District of Florida in early 2004, a failure to issue a
written litigation hold was not sufficient by itself to find gross negligence. Id. at 488.
198. Id. at 479, 484, 491-92.
199. Id. at 479-96.
200. Id. at 478 ("While many of [the 311] documents may be relevant, the Citco De-
fendants suffered no prejudice because all were eventually obtained from other sources."),
480 ("I find that no reasonable juror could conclude that the Citco Defendants were preju-
diced by plaintiffs' failure to produce the 311 Documents.").
20t. Id. at 476.
202. Id. at 478 ("[The lost or destroyed] documents may have been helpful to the Citco
Defendants, helpful to plaintiffs, or of no value to any party.").
203. Id. at 479 ("There can be no serious question that the missing material would have
been relevant.").
204. Id. at 479. Judge Scheindlin did not specify what the critical time period was or
explain why she concluded that the lost documents were created during that period. The
plaintiffs' investments were made between 1997 and 2002. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of
Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 446 F. Supp. 2d 163, 171 (S.D.N.Y.
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and there must have been correspondence with the plaintiffs regarding the
relevant transactions. 205
Judge Scheindlin's ruling with respect to prejudice differed from her
ruling with respect to relevance, however. She decided that the defendants
had not necessarily satisfied their burden of proving they were prejudiced by
the loss of the documents, particularly since the defendants had managed to
gather an enormous amount of other evidence.2 06 With respect to the negli-
gent plaintiffs, she decided that a lesser sanction would be sufficient unless
the defendants showed, through extrinsic evidence, that the loss of the doc-
uments had prejudiced their defense.
With respect to the grossly negligent plaintiffs however, Judge
Scheindlin ruled that the defendants were entitled to a presumption that they
were prejudiced by the loss of the unknown number of documents. She
therefore decided that the jury would receive a spoliation instruction that
would permit the jury to presume, if it so chose, that the lost or destroyed
documents were both relevant and prejudicial. She also ruled that the pre-
sumption with respect to the grossly negligent plaintiffs would be
rebuttable. In addition, she imposed monetary sanctions on all the plaintiffs,
including reasonable attorneys fees for the defendants' bringing the motion
for sanctions, reviewing the declarations submitted by the plaintiffs, and
taking depositions of the declarants. The opinion concluded with the follow-
ing spoliation jury instruction:
The Citco Defendants have argued that 2M, Hunnicutt, Coronation,
the Chagnon Plaintiffs, Bombardier Trusts, and the Bombardier
Foundation destroyed relevant evidence, or failed to prevent the de-
struction of relevant evidence. This is known as the "spoliation of
evidence."
Spoliation is the destruction of evidence or the failure to preserve
property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably
foreseeable litigation. To demonstrate that spoliation occurred, the
Citco Defendants bear the burden of proving the following two el-
ements by a preponderance of the evidence:
First, that relevant evidence was destroyed after the duty to preserve
arose. Evidence is relevant if it would have clarified a fact at issue
2006). Their losses occurred between March 2000, when the Lancer Funds began losing
money, and July 2003, when they were placed into receivership. See Pension Comm. of the
Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 592 F. Supp. 2d 608, 616-17
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). Thus, the critical time period may have been from 1997 until July 2003.
There is no indication when the lost documents were created in any of the published opin-
ions in the case.
205. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 479.
206. Id.
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in the trial and otherwise would naturally have been introduced into
evidence; and
Second, that if relevant evidence was destroyed after the duty to
preserve arose, the evidence lost would have been favorable to the
Citco Defendants.
I instruct you, as a matter of law, that each of these plaintiffs failed
to preserve evidence after its duty to preserve arose. This failure re-
sulted from their gross negligence in performing their discovery
obligations. As a result, you may presume, if you so choose, that
such lost evidence was relevant, and that it would have been favor-
able to the Citco Defendants. In deciding whether to adopt this
presumption, you may take into account the egregiousness of the
plaintiffs' conduct in failing to preserve the evidence.
However, each of these plaintiffs has offered evidence that (1) no
evidence was lost; (2) if evidence was lost, it was not relevant; and
(3) if evidence was lost and it was relevant, it would not have been
favorable to the Citco Defendants.
If you decline to presume that the lost evidence was relevant or
would have been favorable to the Citco Defendants, then your con-
sideration of the lost evidence is at an end, and you will not draw
any inference arising from the lost evidence.
However, if you decide to presume that the lost evidence was rele-
vant and would have been favorable to the Citco Defendants, you
must next decide whether any of the following plaintiffs have rebut-
ted that presumption: 2M, Hunnicutt, Coronation, the Chagnon
Plaintiffs, Bombardier Trusts, or the Bombardier Foundation. If you
determine that a plaintiff has rebutted the presumption that the lost
evidence was either relevant or favorable to the Citco Defendants,
you will not draw any inference arising from the lost evidence
against that plaintiff. If, on the other hand, you determine that a
plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption that the lost evidence was
both relevant and favorable to the Citco Defendants, you may draw
an inference against that plaintiff and in favor of the Citco Defend-
ants-namely that the lost evidence would have been favorable to
the Citco Defendants.
Each plaintiff is entitled to your separate consideration. The ques-
tion as to whether the Citco Defendants have proven spoliation is
personal to each plaintiff and must be decided by you as to each
plaintiff individually.207
207. Id. at 496-97.
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There are a number of problems with this jury instruction. First, the in-
struction would surely be confusing to a jury. After defining spoliation and
setting out the defendants' burden of proof with respect to its two elements,
the instruction states that the jury may presume that the lost evidence was
relevant and favorable to the defendants, but it does not explain what is
meant by the word "presume."2 08 One possible interpretation of the instruc-
tion would be that the jury may infer that the lost evidence was relevant and
favorable to the defendants. However, later parts of the jury instruction state
that the jury should not draw inferences from the lost evidence if it declines
to presume that the lost evidence was relevant and favorable to the defend-
ants, which suggests a distinction between a presumption and an
inference. 209 In addition, interpreting "presume" to mean "infer" is incon-
sistent with the definition of a presumption in Federal Rule of Evidence
301. Rule 301 provides that a presumption in civil actions shifts the burden
of producing evidence but not the burden of persuasion. 210
If the jury instruction is interpreted as using "presume" as provided in
Rule 301, then it would mean that the plaintiffs would have the burden of
producing evidence to rebut the presumption that the lost evidence was rele-
vant and favorable to the defendants, but they would not have the burden of
persuasion on this issue. This interpretation is supported by the later state-
ments in the jury instruction regarding the jury's determination of whether
the plaintiffs have rebutted the presumption. According to one part of the
instruction, the jury should not draw any inference arising from the lost evi-
dence if the jury determines that the plaintiffs have rebutted the
presumption. 211 But this interpretation of the jury instruction is in conflict
with parts of the instruction that expressly state that each plaintiff has pro-
duced evidence that no evidence was lost, and if any evidence was lost, it
was neither relevant nor favorable to the defendants.2 12 Because the jury
instruction states that each plaintiff has produced evidence that rebuts the
presumption, the effect of the presumption would vanish under the "bursting
bubble" theory of Rule 301. The jury instruction would be unnecessary be-
cause the defendants failed to show that the lost evidence was relevant and
favorable to the defendants.
A third interpretation of the jury instruction is that the effect of the pre-
sumption is to shift the burden of persuasion with respect to whether the lost
208. Id. at 496.
209. Id. at 497.
210. FED. R. EvID. 301 provides:
In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party
against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing evidence to
rebut the presumption. But this rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which
remains on the party who had it originally.
211. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
212. Id.
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evidence was relevant and favorable to the defendants from the defendants,
who would normally carry the burden under Rule 301, to the plaintiffs. This
interpretation is consistent with later portions of the instruction that direct
the jury to draw an inference from the lost evidence only if the plaintiff has
not rebutted the presumption. 213 Clearly, this interpretation is inconsistent
with Rule 301, though, which provides that a presumption does not shift the
burden of persuasion. Surely if the jury instruction in Pension Committee is
confusing to a reader of this Article, it would be confusing to a jury.
The jury instruction is also contradictory. One paragraph states that, as a
matter of law, each of the plaintiffs failed to preserve evidence after the duty
to preserve evidence arose. 214 In the following paragraph, however, the in-
struction states that each of the plaintiffs has offered evidence that no
evidence was lost.21 It is not clear whether the jury should consider the
plaintiffs' evidence that no evidence was lost because the court has already
determined as a matter of law that the plaintiffs failed to preserve evidence.
The jury instruction adds that the plaintiffs' failure to preserve evidence
resulted from their gross negligence in performing their discovery obliga-
tions. 216 However, the instruction does not explain the significance of the
court's finding that the plaintiffs were grossly negligent or how this finding
relates to any of the issues that the jury is to decide. It is also not apparent
why the court would instruct the jury that the plaintiffs were grossly negli-
gent. Without any explanation, the court's finding may be unfairly
prejudicial to the plaintiffs because the jury may conclude that the court's
finding of gross negligence negated an element of the plaintiffs' claims.
More importantly, the jury instruction does not describe the nature of
the evidence that the plaintiffs failed to preserve and what its relationship to
the issues in the case may have been. In order for the jury to decide whether
the lost evidence was relevant and favorable to the defendants, the jury
would need to be informed about its general nature.2 17 After all the legal
terminology and contradictions, it is unlikely that the jury would be able to
understand what evidence was supposed to have been destroyed and what
inference it should draw if it decided that the evidence had been destroyed.
In contrast, the jury instruction in Zubulake described the evidence the
defendant failed to produce as "e-mails sent or received by UBS personnel
in August and September 2001 ."218 Although it was impossible to know the
precise content of the lost evidence in Zubulake, the jury instruction did
specify the nature of the lost evidence, and its relationship to the issues in
the case was apparent. Zubulake was an employment discrimination case
213. Id.
214. Id. at 496.
215. Id. at 497.
216. Id. at 496.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
218. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
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brought by a plaintiff who filed her charge with the EEOC on August 16,
2001, and was fired on October 9, 2001, with two weeks' notice.2 19 The de-
fendant's duty to preserve evidence began in April 2001 when litigation was
reasonably anticipated 22 0 and it was clear that the emails the defendants
failed to produce had been destroyed after the duty to preserve them arose.
The plaintiff could offer examples of emails sent and received in August and
September 2001 by UBS personnel that were relevant to the plaintiff's
claims, and it was reasonable to expect that there were other emails from
that time period that UBS personnel had intentionally destroyed that also
would have been relevant.
In contrast, the Pension Committee jury instruction did not identify even
generally the type of evidence the plaintiffs failed to preserve. Moreover,
there does not appear to be any relationship between the issues in the case
and the evidence the plaintiffs failed to preserve. Even if a party failed to
conform to acceptable standards for the preservation of electronic docu-
ments by issuing a written litigation hold when the duty to preserve
evidence arose, and even if the party's failure caused electronic documents
to be destroyed, there is not a basis for sanctions unless the destroyed elec-
tronic documents were relevant or at least would reasonably lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.221
Judge Scheindlin's only explanation of the relevance of the documents
that the plaintiffs failed to preserve was as follows:
All plaintiffs had a fiduciary duty to conduct due diligence before
making significant investments in the Funds. Surely records must
have existed documenting the due diligence, investments, and sub-
sequent monitoring of these investments. The paucity of records
produced by some plaintiffs and the admitted failure to preserve
some records or search at all for others by all plaintiffs leads inexo-
219. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.R.D. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
220. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
221. See Steuben Foods v. Country Gourmet Foods, LLC, No. 08-CV-561S(F), 2011
WL 1549450, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2011) ("[P]arties seeking spoliation sanctions must
establish the destroyed evidence was relevant in that the lost evidence would allow a reason-
able jury to find the evidence probative of the party's claims."); Orbit One Commc'ns v.
Numerex, 271 F.R.D. 429, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Rather than declaring that the failure to
adopt good preservation practices is categorically sanctionable, the better approach is to
consider such conduct as one factor . . . and consider the imposition of sanctions only if
some discovery-relevant data has been destroyed." (internal citation omitted)); Pension
Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 468 ("If a presumption of relevance and prejudice were awarded
to every party who can show that an adversary failed to produce any document, even if such
failure is completely inadvertent, the incentive to find such error and capitalize on it would
be overwhelming. This would not be a good thing."); PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
122 (2nd ed. 2008) ("[T]here is no spoliation if the evidence destroyed was not relevant to
the issues being litigated. There must be some showing that there is a nexus between the
proposed inference and the information contained in the lost evidence.").
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rably to the conclusion that relevant records have been lost or de-
stroyed.222
Pension Committee involved claims for federal securities and common
law fraud arising out of investments in hedge funds between 1997 and
2002.223 The elements of a securities fraud claim are: (1) the making of a
material misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection with
the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance, (5) economic loss, and (6)
causation. 224 Evidence relating to most of these elements would have been
in the defendants' possession because these elements concern the defend-
ants' misrepresentations and scienter. The main exception would be
evidence of the plaintiffs' reliance on the defendants' misrepresentations,
but evidence relating to the plaintiffs' reliance would probably have been
generated during the period between 1997 and 2002 when the plaintiffs
were making their investments rather than after their investments had been
lost.
Even if there had been electronically stored information relating to reli-
ance that was created during the period the plaintiffs were making
investments in the defendants' hedge funds, the plaintiffs were not obligated
to preserve it before April 2003 when their duty to preserve evidence
arose. 225 Consequently, no adverse inference should have arisen from the
loss of the electronically stored information unless it had been lost or de-
stroyed after April 2003.
The Pension Committee decision stated that most of the 311 documents
that the plaintiffs had not produced but the defendants obtained from other
sources were created after April 2003.226 Documents created after April
2003 would not likely be probative of reliance or any other issues in the
case because they would have been created long after the plaintiffs made
their investments in the hedge funds and long after the defendants made
their alleged misstatements or omissions. Although the decision noted that
some documents had been created before 2002227 and the plaintiffs failed to
preserve some evidence after April 2003,228 the decision does not provide
any examples of documents that both were created before 2002 and were
lost or destroyed after April 2003. Thus, there was no showing that any
222. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
223. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC,
446 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y 2006).
224. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
225. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
226. Id.
227. The defendants identified fifty-seven emails that William Hunnicutt sent between
February 3, 1999, and May 14, 2003, that he failed to produce. He also stated in a declara-
tion that he recalled accidentally deleting his email "sent" file prior to March 13, 2003. Id.
228. For example, William Hunnicutt, the President of one of the plaintiffs, testified
that he had a practice of deleting emails unless he felt there was an important reason to keep
them, and he continued to delete emails after 2003. Id. at 482.
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relevant documents were lost or destroyed by the plaintiffs after the duty to
preserve arose.
The use of an adverse inference instruction in Pension Committee is
particularly troubling because the plaintiffs did not purposefully destroy
evidence or engage in willful misconduct.229 Unlike most other circuits,230
the Second Circuit has held that an adverse inference may be appropriate for
negligent spoliation in some circumstances. 23 1 As a matter of logic, a spolia-
tor's destruction of evidence may support an inference that the spoliated
evidence would have been unfavorable to the spoliator only if the spoliator
intended to destroy the evidence and had notice that the evidence was rele-
vant to pending or anticipated litigation.232 Consequently, the circumstantial
link between the spoliation and the adverse inference is broken when the
spoliation is not intentional. 233
In Pension Committee, Judge Scheindlin ruled that there was no willful
misconduct. In addition, the documents that were lost or destroyed either
did not appear to be relevant or else appeared to have been destroyed before
the duty to preserve arose. Thus, it is difficult to see how their loss or de-
struction would have supported an inference that they were unfavorable to
the plaintiffs, even though the court determined that the plaintiffs had been
grossly negligent in failing to preserve them.
B. Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata
Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata2 34 differs substantially
from Pension Committee. Rimkus arose out of the departure of several em-
ployees to form a new company and compete with their former employer,
the Rimkus Consulting Group. Three of the employees, Gary Bell, Nickie
G. Cammarata, and Michael H. DeHarde, filed an action for declaratory
relief against Rimkus in a Louisiana state court on November 15, 2006,
which was the same day that Cammarata resigned from Rimkus and the new
company began operations. 235 In this action, the employees sought a de-
claratory judgment that the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions
in their employment and stock purchase agreements were unenforceable.
229. Id. at 463, 478.
230. For summaries of the precedents in the various circuits, see United States v. Lau-
rent, 607 F.3d 895, 902 n.5 (1st Cir. 2010); Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688
F. Supp. 2d 598, 614-16 & nn.10-13 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
231. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir.
2002).
232. See Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2nd Cir. 1998); Nation-Wide
Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982); MCCORMICK,
supra note 54; Dropkin, supra note 48; Maguire & Vincent, supra note 57, at 235.
233. See Dropkin, supra note 48, at 1826.
234. 688 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
235. Id. at 608, 622-23.
[Vol. 18:1
Spoliation of Electronic Evidence
Rimkus filed a "reconventional demand" which, in Louisiana civil pro-
cedure, is similar to a counterclaim in federal civil procedure. 236 The
reconventional demand asserted causes of action against the employees for
breach of the provisions in the employment and stock purchase agreements,
breach of fiduciary duty, and disparagement. The employees eventually pre-
vailed in the Louisiana action in 2008 with the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal ruling that the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions in
the employment agreements were invalid and unenforceable.2 37 The Louisi-
ana trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of the employees on
Rimkus's reconventional demands against the employees."'
In January and February 2007, Rimkus filed separate suits against
Cammarata and Bell in federal court in Texas and the two suits were consol-
idated before Judge Rosenthal.239 Rimkus alleged in the consolidated federal
action that Cammarata and Bell breached the non-competition and
non-solicitation provisions in their employment agreements. Rimkus also
accused them of using Riikus's trade secrets and proprietary information in
setting up and operating their new company.24 0 In addition, Rimkus alleged
that Bell breached his fiduciary duty to Rimkus by preparing to form the
new company before he resigned from Rimkus.
In the federal action, Rimkus sought the production of documents, in-
cluding emails, relating to communications between Cammarata, Bell, and
other members of the new company that concerned the formation of the new
company, their roles in the new company, and their contacts with clients.
These documents related directly to Rimkus's claims that the defendants
breached the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions in their em-
ployment agreements. Judge Rosenthal determined that the defendants' duty
to preserve evidence arose no later than November 11, 2006, when Bell sent
an email to Cammarata and two others. That email discussed plans to file
the declaratory relief action against Rimkus in Louisiana state court.241
Rimkus moved for spoliation sanctions against Cammarata and Bell in-
cluding a default judgment, an adverse inference instruction, and monetary
sanctions. 24 2 Judge Rosenthal ruled that Rimkus had presented evidence that
the defendants, acting in bad faith and after the duty to preserve evidence
arose, had deleted or destroyed emails that were relevant to Rimkus's claims
for the purpose of making the emails unavailable in the Louisiana and fed-
eral court actions. These emails concerned the setting up and operation of
236. Id. at 629 n.27; LA. CODE Civ. P. ANN., art. 1061 (2005) (providing for permissive
and compulsory reconventional demands by defendants against plaintiffs).
237. Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 626-28; Bell v. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. of La.,
983 So.2d 927, 934 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
238. Rimikus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 629.
239. Id. at 608.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 623-24, 641.
242. Id. at 609.
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the new company, obtaining information from Rimkus and using it for the
new company's benefit, and the solicitation of Rimkus clients. 243
She also ruled that Rimkus had been able to obtain copies of numerous
deleted emails from other sources such as Internet service providers and
email providers. 24 Thus, even though there were likely deleted emails that
Rimkus would never be able to recover, Rimkus still had extensive evidence
to prove its case. In addition, Judge Rosenthal found that some of the emails
the defendants had deleted but were later recovered would probably be help-
ful to their defense. She concluded that ordering a default judgment as a
sanction for the spoliation would not be appropriate because the spoliation
had not resulted in irreparable prejudice to Rimkus.24 5
Judge Rosenthal ruled that an adverse inference instruction would be
appropriate, however, in order to level the evidentiary playing field.246 She
said that she would instruct the jury that in and after November 2006, the
defendants had a duty to preserve emails and other information they knew
would be relevant to anticipated litigation. If the jury decided the defendants
had deleted emails to prevent their use in the litigation, the jury would be
permitted, but was not required, to infer that the emails would have been
unfavorable to the defendants. Finally, the jury would be instructed that it
should consider the defendant's conduct as well as other evidence in deter-
mining the content of the deleted emails. 247 Judge Rosenthal also imposed
monetary sanctions against the defendants for the reasonable costs and at-
torneys' fees that Rimkus required to identify and respond to the
spoliation. 248
In contrast to Judge Scheindlin's adverse inference instruction in Pen-
sion Committee,24 9 Judge Rosenthal's adverse inference instruction was
framed in terms of an inference rather than a presumption. There was no
need to consider the shifting of the burden of proof with respect to the rele-
vance and prejudice of the lost evidence. Judge Rosenthal explained that it
was sufficient to present the jury with the ultimate issue of whether to draw
the adverse inference instead of instructing the jury on the rebuttable pre-
sumption steps.25 0 She also noted that this approach was in line with the
approach the federal courts had used in other contexts that involve a judicial
analysis of burden-shifting followed by a jury instruction on ultimate ques-
tions.251
243. Id. at 644.
244. Id. at 633, 644.
245. Id. at 644-45.
246. Id. at 645.
247. Id. at 646-47.
248. Id. at 647.
249. See supra text accompanying note 207.
250. Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 646-47.
251. Id. at 620 n.21 (citing Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 576 (5th
Cir. 2004); Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 964 F.2d 1471, 1478 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also
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Judge Rosenthal's approach of framing the adverse inference instruc-
tion in terms of an inference is preferable to Judge Scheindlin's use of
presumptions in the jury instruction because it is faithful to Federal Rule of
Evidence 301. It is also less likely to confuse a jury. As the Fifth Circuit
noted in Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co.: "Instructing the jury on the elements
of a prima facie case, presumptions, and the shifting burden of proof is un-
necessary and confusing. Instead, the court should instruct the jury to
consider the ultimate question .... "
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 301, the effect of a presumption disap-
pears once evidence is offered to rebut the presumption. In both Pension
Committee and Rimkus, the spoliators offered evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption that the lost evidence was relevant and unfavorable to the
spoliator. In Pension Committee, Judge Scheindlin emphasized that the
plaintiffs had offered rebuttal evidence in her jury instruction. 253 In Rimkus,
the defendants contended that any emails or documents they destroyed that
could not be obtained from other sources were merely cumulative of other
evidence that Rimkus already had.254 Judge Rosenthal also pointed out that
some of the emails that the defendants deleted but were later recovered were
not unfavorable to the defendants. 255 Spoliators are likely to offer rebuttal
evidence in other cases, and if they do, it is not proper under Federal Rule of
Evidence 301 to give any jury instruction on the presumption.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 301, a conditional jury instruction
concerning the shifting burden of proof for a presumption is required only
when there is a jury question concerning whether evidence has been lost or
destroyed and the spoliator fails to offer any evidence rebutting the pre-
sumption that the lost evidence was relevant and unfavorable to the
spoliator.256 In these circumstances, the jury should be instructed that if it
decides that evidence was lost or destroyed, it must find that the lost evi-
dence was relevant and unfavorable to the spoliator.
It is not necessary to frame the adverse inference for spoliation as a pre-
sumption. In fact, framing it as an adverse inference is preferable. The
benefit of a presumption is to "smoke out" proof by putting pressure on the
presumed-against party to come forward with some evidence to rebut the
presumption in order to avoid summary judgment or judgment as a matter of
law.257 In the context of spoliation of evidence, this benefit is not very
Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming trial judge's refusal to
give instruction on the shifting burdens in an employment discrimination case).
252. Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992).
253. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC,
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
254. 688 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
255. Id. at 646.
256. See supra text accompanying note 140.
257. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993) ("The presump-
tion, having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come forward with some response,
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significant. The adverse inference from spoliation would provide a spoliator
with motivation to contest the inference. Spoliators do not need to be
"smoked out" so long as they are motivated to emerge by other means.
Therefore, little is gained by framing the adverse inference as a presump-
tion. Framing the adverse inference as an inference instead of a presumption
eliminates the need to give a mandatory jury instruction in the rare cases
where the spoliator did not offer evidence to rebut the presumption.
The sanctions of an adverse inference instruction and the award of rea-
sonable costs and attorneys' fees were not the only consequences of the
spoliation in Rimkus. In the federal action, the defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment on account of the judgment in their favor in the declaratory
relief action they had filed in the Louisiana state court.25 8 The defendants
argued that the claims in the federal action were precluded by the holdings
of the Louisiana Court of Appeal, which ruled that the non-competition and
non-solicitation provisions in the defendants' employment and stock pur-
chase agreements were invalid and unenforceable. 259 The defendants also
argued that the trial court's summary judgment should have preclusive effect
with respect to the causes of action for misappropriation of trade secrets or
confidential information, breach of fiduciary duty, and disparagement in the
reconventional demand.260
Judge Rosenthal acknowledged that the requirements for claim and is-
sue preclusion under Louisiana law would normally have been satisfied by
the Louisiana state court judgment and that her court was required to give
full faith and credit to the Louisiana state court judgment. 261 She applied an
exception262 to the preclusive effect of the Louisiana state court judgment,
simply drops out of the picture."); Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
255-56 (1981) ("Placing [the] burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultane-
ously to meet the plaintiffs prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action
and to frame the factual issue with a sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and
fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."); Louisell, supra note 113, at 301 ("The traditional-
ist view is that ... the presumption affects only the burden of production, and that having
smoked out' the opposition's proof the presumption is spent and disappears.").
258. Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
259. Id. at 627.
260. Id. at 646.
261. Id. at 654-63.
262. Judge Rosenthal also decided that the scope of the Louisiana state court's ruling
with respect to the claims for breach of the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions
in the employment and stock purchase agreements was limited to the defendants' activities
in Louisiana. Id. at 659-60. She ruled that the Louisiana state court's decision that the non-
competition and non-solicitation provisions were invalid and unenforceable was based on
Louisiana choice of law rules and Louisiana substantive law, and that the Louisiana state
court had not determined whether these provisions were valid and enforceable under the
Texas choice of law rules and Texas substantive law. See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v.
Cammarata, 257 F.R.D. 127, 138 (S.D. Tex. 2009). Accordingly, the Louisiana state court's
decision that the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions were invalid and unen-
forceable did not apply to the defendants' activities outside of Louisiana. Id. at 140-41.
Judge Rosenthal decided that the Louisiana state court's decision precluded relitigation of
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however, for "exceptional circumstances" 263 on account of the defendants'
spoliation of evidence. 21 Judge Rosenthal reasoned that the defendants had
prevented Rimkus from having a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
claims for misappropriation, breach of fiduciary duty, and disparagement in
the Louisiana action by deleting emails in bad faith and hiding material in-
formation from Rimkus.265
Judge Rosenthal also granted summary judgment dismissing the claims
for disparagement, tortious interference, and damages for breach of the non-
competition and non-solicitation provisions in the employment agreements
on other grounds.266 However, she denied summary judgment with respect
to the claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of fiduciary duty
to the extent it was based on misappropriation, unfair competition, and civil
conspiracy. 267
Judge Rosenthal's ruling with respect to claim and issue preclusion
surely had a greater impact on the litigation than the ruling with respect to
sanctions. Had Judge Rosenthal applied claim and issue preclusion from the
Louisiana state court actions, the federal action would have been dismissed
without a trial.268 in contrast, her ruling on discovery sanctions did not dis-
pose of any claims, and instead merely permitted the jury to make adverse
inferences from the defendants' spoliation of evidence.
Both Pension Committee and Rimkus involved spoliation of electroni-
cally stored information but they differed substantially in their facts, the
applicable law, and the approaches of the two courts to fashioning remedies
for the spoliation. The major differences between the two cases were the
potential relevance of the spoliated evidence and the culpability of the spoli-
ators. In Pension Committee, the spoliated evidence consisted of the
plaintiffs' emails. These emails did not appear to be material to the case,
partly because their only possible relevance was to show the plaintiffs' lack
of reliance on the defendants' misrepresentations and partly because the
plaintiffs' duty to preserve the emails did not arise until long after the
whether the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions were invalid and unenforceable
with respect to the defendants' activities inside Louisiana, however. Id. at 138, 141.
263. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4232 (West 2006) provides in part: "A judgment does
not bar another action by the plaintiff: (1) When exceptional circumstances justify relief
from the res judicata effect of the judgment ..... "
264. Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 664 ("In the present case, weighing the policies under-
lying preclusion law against the evidence that the defendants spoliated evidence relevant to
the misappropriation claims, this court concludes that exceptional circumstances exist such
that preclusion does not apply to those claims.").
265. Id. at 646, 659.
266. Id. at 670-76.
267. Id. at 679.
268. Although the Louisiana state court judgment would not have precluded the claim
for breach of the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions of the employment agree-
ments on account of the defendants' activities outside of Louisiana, see supra note 262,
Judge Rosenthal decided that this claim was barred by the substantive law of Texas. Rimkus,
688 F. Supp. 2d at 673-74.
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defendants made the misrepresentations. 2 69 As a consequence, the plaintiffs
were unlikely to have been motivated to delete the emails for the purpose of
preventing the defendants from obtaining them in discovery. Instead, Judge
Scheindlin found that the plaintiffs in Pension Committee were either negli-
gent or grossly negligent with respect to their duty to preserve evidence.
In contrast, the deleted emails in Rimkus were likely to have been di-
rectly related to the plaintiff's claims for breach of the non-competition and
non-solicitation provisions, misappropriation of trade secrets and customer
lists, and breach of fiduciary duty, because the emails would have been cre-
ated contemporaneously with the defendants' alleged wrongful actions and
after the defendants had a duty to preserve them.270 As a consequence, the
defendants had a substantial motivation to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining
the spoliated evidence in discovery. In addition, there was other circumstantial
evidence that the defendants deleted the emails intentionally and in bad
faith.2 7 1 Because both the potential relevance of the spoliated evidence and the
culpability of the spoliators were less in Pension Committee than in Rimkus,
the inference that the spoliated evidence would have been unfavorable to the
spoliators would likely be considerably weaker in Pension Committee than
in Rimkus.
The applicable law also differed dramatically between Pension Commit-
tee and Rimkus because the Second Circuit allows the use of an adverse
inference instruction for negligent or grossly negligent spoliation2 7 2 while
the Fifth Circuit requires bad faith for an adverse inference from spolia-
tion. 273 Since the plaintiffs in Pension Committee did not delete emails
intentionally or in bad faith, an adverse inference instruction would not have
been allowed if the case had been in the Fifth Circuit or perhaps any other
circuit besides the Second Circuit.
Finally, the approaches that the two trial judges took in fashioning an
adverse inference instruction differed significantly. Judge Scheindlin's ap-
proach was more aggressive. She said she would instruct the jury that as a
matter of law the plaintiffs had failed to preserve evidence after the duty to
preserve arose, and that the failure resulted from the plaintiffs' gross negli-
gence in performing their discovery obligations. In addition, Judge
Scheindlin's instruction would direct the jury that, as a result of the failure
269. See supra text accompanying notes 223-228.
270. Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 641-42.
271. Id. at 644.
272. See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir.
2002) ("[D]iscovery sanctions, including an adverse inference instruction, may be imposed
upon a party that has breached a discovery obligation not only through bad faith or gross
negligence, but also through ordinary negligence . . . .").
273. See Vick v. Tex. Emp't Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The adverse
inference to be drawn from destruction of records is predicated on bad conduct of the de-
fendant. 'Moreover, the circumstances of the act must manifest bad faith."') (quoting
EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE § 273 (2d ed. 1972)).
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to preserve evidence, it may choose to presume that the lost evidence would
have been relevant and favorable to the defendants. If the jury decided to
presume the lost evidence was relevant and would have been favorable to
the defendants, the jury must then determine whether each of the plaintiffs
rebutted the presumption.
Ultimately, Judge Scheindlin's instruction hinged on whether the plain-
tiff rebutted the presumption. The jury would not draw any inference against
the plaintiff from lost evidence if the plaintiff successfully rebutted the pre-
sumption. If the plaintiff was unsuccessful, the jury would be permitted to
draw an inference that the lost evidence would have been favorable to the
defendants. 27 4
Judge Rosenthal's approach was more restrained in directing the jury
with respect to the adverse inference from spoliation. Judge Rosenthal con-
cluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that
the defendants had intentionally destroyed potentially relevant evidence275
but she did not tell the jury that the defendants' conduct was intentional.
She also declined to instruct the jury on the rebuttable presumption steps.276
Instead, she decided to allow the jury to hear the evidence about the defend-
ants' spoliation. Then she instructed the jury on the defendants' duty to
preserve evidence. If the jury found that the defendants deleted emails to
prevent Rimkus from using the emails in the litigation, the jury could, but
would not be required to, infer that the lost emails would have been unfa-
vorable to the defendants. 27 7 Ironically, Judge Rosenthal's adverse inference
instruction is likely to have greater impact than Judge Scheindlin's instruc-
tion, not because of differences in the contents of the jury instructions, but
because of the greater potential relevance of the spoliated evidence and
greater culpability of the spoliators in Rimkus than in Pension Committee.
The substance of the evidence thus matters.
The next section discusses an alternative approach that courts should
consider using to deal with spoliation of evidence. Instead of imposing an
adverse inference instruction as a sanction for spoliation, a court should
allow any evidence of spoliation and discovery misconduct to be admitted to
the extent that it is relevant, and then permit counsel to argue the inferences
that the jury should draw from the evidence of spoliation.
IV. COURTS SHOULD RELY MORE ON ATTORNEY ADVOCACY
Spoliation of electronically stored information has become a serious
problem in the courts, but sanctions are usually not the best way for courts
to address the issue. Motions for sanctions are time consuming for both
274. See supra text accompanying note 207.
275. Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 642-44.
276. Id. at 620.
277. Id. at 646.
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courts and counsel, and consequently, they drive up the cost of litigation.
Moreover, because sanctions are inherently punitive, motions for sanctions
cause the level of contentiousness in litigation to increase. An especially
antagonistic and high-stakes motion will not promote the spirit of coopera-
tion and collaboration that is needed during electronic discovery.27 8
In addition, the use of adverse inference instructions as a form of sanc-
tions creates an inconsistency in the division of labor between judges and
juries with respect to fact-finding.2 79 In both Pension Committee and Rim-
kus, for example, the trial judges found it necessary to make detailed
findings regarding the culpability of the spoliators and the relevance of the
spoliated evidence in order to justify the sanctions.280 Yet both judges al-
lowed their juries to make their own determinations on whether spoliation
occurred as well as on the relevance and prejudicial effect of the spolia-
tion. 281 It thus appeared that the judges were directing their juries to redo
much of the fact-finding that the judges had already done.28 2
Instead of imposing an adverse inference instruction as a sanction, it
would be more appropriate in most cases for trial courts to permit attorneys
to offer evidence of spoliation and discovery misconduct at trial. Then each
side could argue the permissible inferences that the jury should draw from
this evidence.
Under the liberal standard for relevance in Federal Rule of Evidence
401, evidence of spoliation is admissible if: "(a) it has any tendency to make
a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b)
the fact is of consequence in determining the action."283 The logical basis for
the relevance of spoliation is "the common sense notion that a party's de-
struction of evidence which it has reason to believe may be used against it in
litigation suggests that the evidence was harmful to the party responsible for
its destruction."284 As the First Circuit explained in Nation-Wide Check
Corp., Inc. v. Forest Hills Distributors, Inc.:
The evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the common sense
observation that a party who has notice that a document is relevant
to litigation and who proceeds to destroy the document is more
278. See generally THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COOPERA-
ION PROCLAMATION (2008), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/
tsc.cooperation-proclamation/proclamation.pdf ("The Sedona Conference launches a coor-
dinated effort to promote cooperation by all parties to the discovery process to achieve the
goal of a 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."').
279. See Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 202 (D.S.C. 2008).
280. See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.,
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 642-46.
281. See Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 497; Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 646-47.
282. See Nucor Corp., 251 F.R.D. at 203 (observing that this allocation of labor "makes
little sense").
283. FED. R. EvID. 401.
284. Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998).
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likely to have been threatened by the document than is a party in
the same position who does not destroy the document. The fact of
destruction satisfies the minimum requirement of relevance: it has
some tendency, however small, to make the existence of a fact at is-
sue more probable than it would otherwise be. See Fed.R.Evid.
401. Precisely how the document might have aided the party's ad-
versary, and what evidentiary shortfalls its destruction may be taken
to redeem, will depend on the particular facts of each case, but the
general evidentiary rationale for the inference is clear."'
The First Circuit's analysis of the logical relevance of spoliation de-
pended on the notice and intent of the spoliator.286 If a spoliator lacked
knowledge of the content that was destroyed or if the destruction was acci-
dental rather than deliberate, the spoliation would no longer be relevant.287
The requirements of the spoliator's notice and intent are instances of condi-
tional relevance because evidence of spoliation lacks relevance unless these
requirements are satisfied.
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) supplies the standard for the admissi-
bility of conditionally relevant spoliated evidence. Rule 104(b) provides:
"When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof
must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist.
The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof
be introduced later."288
Under Rule 104(b), a trial court is not required to make a finding that a
spoliator had notice of the spoliated evidence's relevance. Nor is the trial
judge required to hold that the spoliator acted intentionally in order to admit
evidence of spoliation. Instead, the trial court is required to make only a
preliminary finding that there is a sufficient evidentiary foundation for a jury
285. Nation-Wide Check Corp., Inc. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218
(1st Cir. 1982).
286. Id.; see also Booker v. Mass. Dep't of Pub. Health, 612 F.3d 34, 46 (1st Cir. 2010)
(noting that the foundation required for adverse inference is that the spoliator had knowledge
of the claim and the potential relevance of the spoliated evidence to the claim); Vodusek v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995) ("An adverse inference about a
party's consciousness of the weakness of his case ... requires a showing that the party knew
the evidence was relevant to some issue at trial and that his willful conduct resulted in its
loss or destruction.").
287. See D'Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., No. 06-687 (JDB/JMF), 2010 WL
3324964, at *10, (D.D.C. 2010) ("When, as in this case, it is not a party's bad faith that leads
to the destruction of evidence, its actions hardly bespeak an intention worthy of such a harsh
punishment [as an adverse inference instruction] because the logical premise of the instruc-
tion-that the spoliator must have destroyed the evidence to keep any one from seeing it-is
not there."); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 526 (D. Md. 2010);
MCCORMICK, supra note 54; Dropkin, supra note 48, at 1826 (spoliation inference does not
hold true if the spoliator is innocent and may not hold true if the spoliator is merely negligent
or reckless); Maguire & Vincent, supra note 57; Nance, supra note 64.
288. FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
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to determine that these conditions have been fulfilled.28 9 The jury then re-
gains its place as the ultimate finder of fact.
Although both the trial court and the jury must consider the evidence of
the spoliator's notice and intent with respect to the spoliation, the trial
court's role under Rule 104(b) is limited to deciding whether it would be
reasonable for the jury to find that the prerequisite conditions to relevance
have been fulfilled. Consequently, the trial court's preliminary finding on the
admissibility of the spoliated evidence would differ from the jury's ultimate
finding of its relevancy, and the fact-finding roles of the trial court and jury
would be neither inconsistent nor duplicative.
Under the conditional relevancy standard of Rule 104(b), a trial court
would be obliged to admit evidence of spoliation even if it was not itself
convinced of the spoliator's notice and intent with respect to the spoliation.
Circumstantial proof is generally required for issues of knowledge and in-
tent, and a spoliator's fault lies along a continuum ranging from accidental
loss of evidence to bad faith.2 90 A jury's determination of a spoliator's men-
tal state could require consideration of numerous factors such as the type of
evidence, the timing and manner of spoliation, and the reasons the spoliator
may offer for the destruction of the evidence.
In many cases, the trial court would have to admit the evidence of spo-
liation so that the jury could determine the spoliator's culpability, even
though the court was not itself persuaded that the spoliator had knowledge
of the contents of the spoliated evidence and destroyed it deliberately. For
example, although Judge Scheindlin decided in Pension Committee that
none of the plaintiffs had engaged in willful misconduct,2 91 there may have
been sufficient circumstantial evidence presented to satisfy the conditional
relevance standard. 292
289. See FED. R. EvID. 104 advisory committee's note, Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 198 (1972) ("The judge makes a preliminary
determination whether the foundation evidence is sufficient to support a finding of fulfill-
ment of the condition. If so, the item is admitted. If after all the evidence on the issue is in,
pro and con, the jury could reasonably conclude that fulfillment of the condition is not estab-
lished, the issue is for them.").
290. See Reilly v. Natwest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 267 (2d Cir. 1999) ("'[Spoli-
ation occurs] along a continuum of fault-ranging from innocence through the degrees of
negligence to intentionality."' (quoting Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th
Cir. 1988))).
291. See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.,
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
292. For example, a reasonable jury might have concluded that William Hunnicutt, who
was President of one of the plaintiffs, had knowledge of the contents of the emails he deleted
and that he intentionally deleted them. Id. at 482. On the other hand, the judge would have to
determine what issues the deleted emails may have been relevant to, and she would have
discretion to exclude the evidence of spoliation under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 if its
probative value was outweighed by other factors, such as that it was cumulative of other
evidence.
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Of course, the trial court would have discretion under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403293 to exclude the evidence of spoliation if the court deter-
mined that the probative value of the evidence of spoliation was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Depending on
the circumstances, presentation of evidence of spoliation may be time con-
suming and confusing to the jury, particularly if the evidence would involve
technical details concerning electronically stored information that would
require expert testimony. If it was not clear that the spoliation occurred or
what the contents of the spoliated evidence were likely to have been, a trial
court might exclude the evidence of spoliation under Rule 403 on the
grounds that the probative value of the evidence of spoliation was substan-
tially outweighed by the costs involved in presenting it at trial.
The trial judges in both Pension Committee and Rimkus noted that, de-
spite the spoliation, the innocent parties had been able to gather extensive
evidence.294 As a consequence, by the time of trial, the trial judges could
decide whether the evidence of spoliation was cumulative of other evidence
that the innocent parties were able to introduce. The trial judges might then
exclude the evidence of spoliation under Rule 403, making the adverse in-
ference instructions unnecessary and inappropriate. Both Pension
Committee and Rimkus were sufficiently complicated so as to make it diffi-
cult to determine during the pretrial discovery phase how significant the
evidence of spoliation would be at trial. The respective judges may have
been better served by waiting until after they had seen the evidence present-
ed at the trial before ruling on whether to give an adverse inference
instruction.
Once evidence of spoliation has been introduced, the attorney for the
innocent party may urge the jury during closing arguments to draw an ad-
verse inference from the spoliation.29 5 The attorney for the spoliator may
respond with contrary arguments. 296 Courts normally permit attorneys wide
293. FED. R. EvID. 403.
294. See Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 479 ("The Citco Defendants have gathered
an enormous amount of discovery-both from documents and witnesses."); Rimkus Consult-
ing Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 646 (S.D. Tex. 2010) ("At the same time,
it is important that Rimkus has extensive evidence to use in this case.").
295. See RICE, supra note 221, at 169-70 ("Regardless of the specific sanctions im-
posed by a court for spoliation, injured parties can argue [the] logical inference to the jury,
asking its members to draw a negative conclusion about the offending party's claim.").
296. See Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 750 (8th Cir. 2004) ("A permis-
sive inference is subject to reasonable rebuttal.").
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latitude in closing arguments,2 97 and this includes arguing reasonable infer-
ences from the evidence.29 8
Whether the trial judge should emphasize the adverse inference from
spoliation with a jury instruction would be a matter for the judge's discre-
tion.29 9 In most cases, the judge should leave the adverse inference to the
arguments of the attorneys and not give a jury instruction.300 There are myr-
iad inferences that the jury must choose from in the course of its
deliberations, 30' and the judge could not possibly give a specific instruction
for each of them. 302
An adverse inference instruction is unnecessary in most cases because a
jury ought to be able to understand the idea behind the adverse inference
without an instruction. As Wigmore observed, "the inference, indeed, is one
297. See Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[Alttorneys are
given 'wide latitude in formulating their arguments' to the jury.") (quoting Reilly v. Natwest
Markets Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 271 (2nd Cir. 1999)).
298. See Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 745 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Attorneys have more
leeway in closing arguments [than in opening statements] to suggest inferences based on the
evidence, highlight weaknesses in the opponent's case, and emphasize strengths in their own
case."); Whittenburg v. Werner Enters. Inc., 561 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 2000)
("[T]he cardinal rule of closing argument [is] that counsel must confine comments to evi-
dence in the record and to reasonable inferences from that evidence."); 75A Am. JUR. 2D
Trial § 444 (2010) ("Counsel is granted wide latitude to discuss the merits of the case, both
as to the law and facts, and is entitled to argue his or her case vigorously and to argue all
reasonable inferences from the evidence, even though the inferences drawn are illogical or
erroneous, and the law indulges a liberal attitude toward closing argument." (footnotes omit-
ted)).
299. See Booker v. Mass. Dep't of Pub. Health, 612 F.3d 34, 46 (1st Cir. 2010) ("A
'trial court's decision to give or refuse an adverse inference instruction is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion."' (quoting Gilbert v. Cosco Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 406 (10th Cir. 1993))).
See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 138, § 107.21[2] ("The judge may indicate to the jury the
inferences that may rationally be drawn from evidence before it.").
300. See Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2003)
("A District Court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to emphasize legal inferences
favoring one side. Emphasizing arguable inferences to jurors is the job of advocates, not
courts."); see also Managed Care Solutions, Inc. v. Essent Healthcare, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d
1317, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (holding that denial of adverse inference instruction did not
preclude introduction of evidence and argument of counsel concerning spoliation); Floeter v.
City of Orlando, No. 6:05-cv-400-Orl-22KRS, 2007 WL 486633, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 9,
2007) (holding that "the negligent destruction of evidence is insufficient to support an ad-
verse inference instruction.").
301. See Schulz v. Pa. R.R., 350 U.S. 523, 526 (1956) ("The very essence of [the ju-
ry's] function is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it
considers most reasonable." (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35
(1944))).
302. See Hasham v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035, 1051 (7th Cir. 2000)
("Rather than describing each possible inference of the evidence, the judge may and usually
should leave the subject of the interpretation of the evidence to the argument of counsel.");
Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Many an inference is permissible.
Rather than describing each, the judge may and usually should leave the subject to the argu-
ment of counsel.").
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of the simplest in human experience ... ."303 An adverse inference jury in-
struction may also accord undue weight to the spoliation of evidence.304 Even
if a jury instruction states that it only permits and does not require an adverse
inference from spoliation, a jury is likely to view the instruction as having the
weight of law.305 In contrast, jurors are likely to view the arguments of attor-
neys with a healthy bit of skepticism, especially if, as is often the case, the jury
is instructed that statements of attorneys are not evidence.306
Adverse inferences are not all alike, and the strength of a particular ad-
verse inference may depend on a variety of factors. Whether it is reasonable
for a jury to infer that lost or destroyed evidence was unfavorable to the spo-
liator would surely depend on the claims being asserted and the relationship
of the evidence to the claims. The adverse inference from spoliation would
be especially strong if it was clear that the lost or destroyed evidence was at
the heart of the case, as was the missing jewel of the chimney sweeper in
Armory3 07 and the missing airbag and truck in Flury.308 In these instances,
the spoliator must have known that the evidence needed to be preserved.
Weighing the probative value of spoliation might be more complicated in
other cases. In an employment discrimination case, for example, determining
the strength of any adverse inference arising from the deletion of emails would
probably require considering a multitude of factors. These would include
where the emails were stored, who had access to them, who destroyed them,
when they were created and destroyed, the content of other emails, whether
other evidence in the case was consistent with the adverse inference, and
whether the emails were deleted willfully or accidentally.
The Zubulake line of cases illustrates the complexity of the analysis that
may be needed. In Zubulake I31 and III310 Judge Scheindlin ruled that the
303. See supra text accompanying note 42.
304. See Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (noting the dan-
ger that an instruction that the jury may draw an adverse inference from a party's failure to
call a missing witness "may add a fictitious weight to one side or another of the case").
305. See id. at 235 ("[A]n instruction of the court granting to the jury the right to draw the
inference of unfavorable testimony ... has the weight of law, even when it only permits and
does not require the inference, whereas counsel's argument is only that."); Robert H. Stier, Jr.,
Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference-Quieting the Loud Voice from the Empty Chair, 44
MD. L. REV. 137, 168 (1985) ("[A] jury instruction has the weight of law, even if, in the case of
instruction as to an inference, it only permits and does not require the inference.").
306. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990) ("[Arguments of counsel] are
usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of argument, not evidence, .. . and are likely
viewed as the statements of advocates."); Stier, supra note 305, at 168 ("The formal distinc-
tion between argument and instruction is well recognized.. . . Jurors may treat the argument
for what it is.").
307. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
309. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.R.D. 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) ("Zubulake is entitled to discovery of the requested e-mails so long as they are rele-
vant to her claims, which they clearly are.").
310. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) ("[A] review of these e-mails reveals that they are relevant.").
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emails on the defendant's backup tapes were relevant in the sense that they
bore on the issues in the litigation. 311 Nevertheless, she decided in Zubulake
IV that Zubulake had not shown that the lost tapes contained relevant infor-
mation. There was no reason to believe that the lost emails were likely to
have supported Zubulake's claim of employment discrimination and it was
unlikely that any relevant emails had been on the particular tapes that were
lost.3 12 Judge Scheindlin ultimately decided in Zubulake V, however, that the
contents of the lost tapes would have been favorable to Zubulake based on
the content of emails recovered from other sources and the culpability of the
defendant's employees for willfully deleting emails. 313
The probative value of spoliation is often highly nuanced and dependent
on the particular circumstances of the case. An adverse inference instruction
could not satisfactorily set out all the considerations that should go into
weighing the probative value of the spoliation without delving into many of
the details surrounding the spoliation. Any adverse inference instruction that
attempted to do so would probably fail to be truly neutral and would be
cumbersome and confusing to the jury.
Drawing the connection between spoliation and an adverse inference is
better left to the advocacy of counsel, who can best bring out the considera-
tions for and against the inference without being concerned about
maintaining the neutrality required for a jury instruction.3 14 An attorney may
be tempted to exaggerate the probative value of spoliation in a particular
case, but doing so may risk loss of credibility with the jury and also invite
persuasive rebuttal from opposing counsel. As always, the court may inter-
vene if an attorney's argument is improper, but it generally should allow
zealous advocacy so long as the argument stays within reasonable
bounds.315
Professor Dale Nance has argued in a series of articles that adverse in-
ference instructions have a number of shortcomings, and that instead of
having juries determine the consequences of spoliation, courts should im-
pose sanctions such as issue preclusion and dismissals or default judgments
311. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 221 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) ("1 found in Zubulake I and Zubulake III that the e-mails contained on UBS's backup
tapes were, by-and-large, relevant in the sense that they bore on the issues in the litigation.").
312. Id. ("Accordingly, Zubulake has not sufficiently demonstrated that the lost tapes
contained relevant information.").
313. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 437 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) ("1 am convinced that the contents of the lost tapes would have been similarly, if not
more, favorable [than the content of emails recovered from other sources].").
314. See United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1391 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Arguing
inferences is standard business among lawyers.").
315. See MCCORMICK, supra note 54, § 264 ("[I1f an argument on the failure to produce
proof is fallacious, the remedy is the answering argument and the jury's good sense. Thus,
the judge should be required to intervene only when the argument, under the general stand-
ard, can be said to be not merely weak or unfounded, but unfair and prejudicial.").
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in order to shield juries from having to consider spoliation." 6 He criticizes
not only adverse inference instructions but also attorney arguments to juries
concerning adverse inferences.' 17 His position is that the role of juries
should be limited to making the final decision in the case while the trial
judge should manage procedural matters such as the discovery process. 18
Professor Nance also argues that evidence of spoliation lacks probative
value and risks unfair prejudice.319 Professor Nance would allow attorneys
to argue that a jury may make inferences based on the absence of supporting
evidence, but he distinguishes arguments based on a party's spoliation of
evidence, which he finds unacceptable. 320
Professor Nance is right that juries should not be imposing sanctions on
parties for violations of their discovery obligations, including for spoliation
of evidence. However, adverse inference instructions do not direct juries to
impose sanctions, and it would be improper for attorneys to argue to juries
that they should impose sanctions for spoliation. Instead, adverse inference
instructions inform juries that they are permitted to draw inferences from
spoliation that the spoliated materials would have been unfavorable to the
spoliator.3 2 1 How a jury will respond to either a jury instruction or attorney
argument for adverse inferences will depend on the particular circumstances
of the case. In some cases, the fact of spoliation may have little probative
value concerning the content of the spoliated material and whether it was
unfavorable to the spoliator, and it should be expected that juries would
316. See Dale A. Nance, Missing Evidence, 13 CARDOzo L. REv. 831, 879 (1991)
("When used in jury trials, the classic adverse inference relieves the trial judge of the re-
sponsibility of deciding what to make of the claim of suppression, but only by placing the
burden on participants more poorly suited to bear it."); Nance, supra note 60, at 1091
("[T]he use of adverse inferences should be radically curtailed in favor of simpler remedies
that are imposed by the court without the involvement of the jury."); Nance, supra note 64,
at 660 ("My main point is that . . . it is the duty of the trial judge to assure that the trier of
fact is not placed in the position of having to decide a case under conditions of unreasonably
incomplete evidence.").
317. See Nance, supra note 60, at 1091 ("[M]ost of what I have to say does not depend
on whether such an inference is encouraged by an argument or sanctioned by a jury instruc-
tion.").
318. See Nance, supra note 60, at 1106-07; Nance, Missing Evidence, supra note 316,
at 879 ("Questions about litigation tactics and the plausibility of excuses for nonpresentation
of evidence are probably better handled by the trial judge, whose experience and training
provides an expertise relative to such questions that is not shared by the jury.").
319. Nance, supra note 60, at 1099-103.
320. Nance, supra note 60, at 1119-20 ("Counsel would still be able to observe that a
fact endorsed by the opponent is unsupported or poorly supported by the evidence before the
court, or that the parties' investigation has not ruled out alternative hypotheses about the
events being litigated. What they would not be allowed to do is to identify some particular
potential witness or tangible thing, known or claimed to exist or to have existed, and argue
or suggest that significance attaches to the fact that the opponent has destroyed or withheld
that witness or thing from the court. Such an argument is almost always intended to elicit the
inference that the opponent is hiding something from the jury." (footnote omitted)).
321. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 109, 207, 246-247.
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decide accordingly. But in other cases, spoliation may have substantial pro-
bative value.
For example, in Rimkus, the defendants admitted that they deleted large
numbers of electronic documents and emails after leaving their employer to
set up a competing company. The explanations they gave in their deposi-
tions were inconsistent and lacked evidentiary support.322 It would not be
unreasonable for a jury to infer from these facts that the defendants took
confidential information from their former employer and breached noncom-
petition and nonsolicitation covenants by contacting their former employer's
clients, as the plaintiff alleged in the complaint.
It bears emphasis that the rationales and purposes for adverse inferences
differ from those for sanctions. Adverse inferences are evidentiary, and they
are based on the extent of the logical tendency, if any, that evidence of spo-
liation may have to prove the probable content of the spoliated material. In
contrast, sanctions are punitive, and courts impose them to deter spoliation
in order "to prevent unfair prejudice to litigants and to insure the integrity of
the discovery process." 323 As such, the standards for adverse inferences dif-
fer from the standards for sanctions, such as dismissals, default judgments,
or issue preclusion. Willfulness or bad faith should generally be required for
an adverse inference because without willfulness or bad faith, there is no
logical connection between spoliation and the content of the spoliated mate-
rial.324
On the other hand, sanctions may be warranted in the absence of will-
fulness or bad faith in order to serve the goals of deterrence, level the
playing fields for litigants, and preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
For example, in Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., the record was not clear
whether the spoliation was negligent or deliberate, but the appellate court
ruled that the sanction of dismissal was not an abuse of the trial court's dis-
cretion because the spoliation was so highly prejudicial that it would have
prevented the defendant from being able to defend the case.325 Moreover, in
Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., the jury evidently refused to draw an ad-
verse inference against the plaintiff for spoliation after receiving an adverse
inference instruction because it returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The ap-
pellate court then reversed and ordered dismissal on account of the
prejudice to the defendant that resulted from the spoliation. 326
322. See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 642-43
(S.D. Tex. 2010).
323. Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 944 (11 th Cir. 2005).
324. See supra note 287.
325. Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 593-95 (4th Cir. 2001).
326. Flury, 427 F.3d at 942-43, 947. See also Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp.,
116 F.R.D. 107, 136 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (finding entry of default judgment as a sanction for
spoliation was appropriate in part because permitting an adverse inference would not be an
effective deterrent).
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Thus, dismissal or a default judgment may be an appropriate remedy for
spoliation in some cases when the spoliator's conduct was especially egre-
gious or the spoliation caused severe prejudice to the innocent party.327 in
addition, monetary sanctions may be justifiable if spoliation has caused an
innocent party to incur additional expense to obtain discovery of electroni-
cally stored information from alternative sources. 328 Other sanctions listed in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) 329 may also be appropriate
where an adverse inference would not be an effective remedy for spoliation.
While sanctions would be a superior remedy for spoliation in some cas-
es, adverse inferences are better in those circumstances where inferences
about the content of the spoliated materials are reasonable on account of a
logical connection between the fact of spoliation and the probable content
of the spoliated material. Where the fact of spoliation has probative value,
the trial court should permit the jury to consider it along with the rest of the
evidence rather than removing the jury from the process by imposing dis-
positive sanctions, such as dismissal, default judgment, or issue preclusion.
Otherwise, trial by discovery may threaten to replace trial by jury.
CONCLUSION
The spoliation of evidence has a long history in the courts. Traditional-
ly, courts have relied on adverse inferences as a remedy for spoliation.
Adverse inferences are not always adequate, though, particularly where it is
difficult to infer the contents of the spoliated material. With the development
of discovery, courts have increasingly turned to the use of sanctions as a
deterrent against spoliation. A significant recent trend has been the use of
adverse inference jury instructions as sanctions in cases involving electronic
discovery, in part because courts consider them a compromise between
non-action and more severe, final sanctions such as dismissal or default
judgment.
Spoliation of evidence has attracted increasing concern in the past cou-
ple of decades due to the explosion in the volume of electronically stored
information, the increasing use of electronically stored information in litiga-
tion as a source of proof of factual issues, and the ease with which
327. See Flury, 427 F.3d at 944-45; Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 593.
328. See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 647-48
(S.D. Tex. 2010) (imposing monetary sanctions of costs and attorneys' fees reasonably in-
curred in investigating spoliation, obtaining lost emails from third parties, and taking
additional depositions concerning spoliation); Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pen-
sion Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (awarding
reasonable costs, including attorneys' fees, associated with reviewing declarations concern-
ing spoliation, deposing declarants, and filing motion for sanctions).
329. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(a). These sanctions include directing that designated facts
be taken as established, prohibiting the spoliator from supporting or opposing designated
claims or defenses, prohibiting the spoliator from introducing designated evidence, and the
striking of pleadings in whole or part.
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electronically stored information may be destroyed. Emails have probably
received the most attention, as lawyers have been able to identify emails that
opposing parties have deleted by cross-checking sent and received email
copies and email copies that have been sent to multiple parties. Even though
copies of the deleted emails are recovered, the lawyers still seek sanctions
for the spoliation, including adverse inference instructions regarding possi-
ble other deleted emails that the lawyers could not recover. This has led to
spoliation being denominated "the newest battleground of contemporary
litigation."330
The concern over spoliation is highlighted by two significant recent
cases in which prominent federal judges took differing approaches to deal-
ing with spoliation of evidence. Both Judge Scheindlin and Judge Rosenthal
decided to give adverse inference instructions as sanctions for spoliation of
evidence. However, they used different standards for the culpability required
for imposing the sanctions.
Following Second Circuit precedent, Judge Scheindlin imposed sanc-
tions for spoliation that was grossly negligent rather than willful or in bad
faith. In contrast, Judge Rosenthal followed Fifth Circuit precedent that re-
quired bad faith for the imposition of the sanction of an adverse inference
instruction. In addition, the terms of the adverse inference instructions that
the two judges decided to give differed materially. Judge Scheindlin's ad-
verse inference instruction stated that the jury may presume, if it chose, that
the spoliated evidence was both relevant and would have been unfavorable
to the spoliators. In contrast, Judge Rosenthal would ask the jury to decide
whether the parties intentionally deleted evidence and then, if it found that
they had done so, to decide whether to infer that the deleted evidence would
have been unfavorable to the parties.
Of the two approaches, Judge Rosenthal's jury instruction is preferable.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 301, juries should generally not be in-
structed on the effect of presumptions because a presumption shifts the
burden of going forward with the evidence, which should be handled by the
judge. Also, the Fifth Circuit precedent that requires bad faith for an adverse
inference concerning spoliation makes more sense than the Second Circuit
precedent because there is no logical basis for a jury to draw an adverse
inference from spoliation unless the spoliator acted willfully or in bad faith.
What would be preferable to either of these approaches, however,
would be for trial judges to move away from the use of adverse inference
instructions as sanctions for spoliation. Instead, judges should simply allow
attorneys to offer evidence of spoliation during the trial to the extent it is
relevant. Then, after the presentation of the evidence, the judge should allow
attorneys to argue any adverse inferences to the jury.
330. See Shapiro, supra note 1.
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Like other inferences, adverse inferences should be based on the logical
relationship between the spoliation of evidence and the issues in the case
rather than on the policies of deterrence and punishment that provide the
basis for sanctions. Instead of arguing over the opposing party's preserva-
tion of evidence to the judge during discovery, attorneys could focus on
preparing to argue to the jury the significance of the evidence of spoliation
to the merits of the case. Where spoliation is particularly egregious or has
severely prejudiced a party's case, the sanctions of dismissal or a default
judgment are available, but for the more common circumstances, the better
remedy for spoliation is attorney advocacy rather than sanctions.

